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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1993, when the Supreme Court decided Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,' no predatory pricing plaintiff has
prevailed in a final determination in the federal courts.' This case was a
great victory for the Chicago School of antitrust. One leader of that school,
then-Professor Frank Easterbrook, once asked whether there are so many
theories of predation because it "is a common but variegated phenomenon"
or rather "for the same reason that 600 years ago there were a thousand
positions on what dragons looked like." 3 He concluded that predation was
much like dragons and that "there is no sufficient reason for antitrust law or
the courts to take [predation] seriously." 4
This Essay argues that the decision in Brooke Group was no great day
for consumers, for well-functioning markets, or for antitrust law. The
Court's reading of the law is unduly narrow and should be revisited. In
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particular, there is no compelling reason to restrict predation cases to
below-cost pricing,5 as above-cost pricing can also hurt consumers by
limiting competition.6  In cases of monopolization or attempted
monopolization, such "above-cost predation" may be more plausible and
prevalent than below-cost predation. As a result, this Essay argues that the
courts should limit the Brooke Group holding to oligopoly cases like that in
which it arose.7
The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently sued American Airlines for
predatory pricing and predatory expansion of flights on routes to and from
its hub at the Dallas-Fort Worth airport. 8 The DOJ made a plausible case
5. In cases before Brooke Group, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that low-cost pricing
was a necessary element in a predation case. However, as the Brooke Group opinion notes, in
those two cases, the Court formally reserved the question "'whether recovery should ever be
available .. when the pricing in question is above some measure of incremental cost."' Brooke
Group, 509 U.S. at 223 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585
n.9 (1986)). Brooke Group comes the closest to holding that above-cost pricing is per se legal
because it unequivocally states that below-cost pricing is a necessary element of predation,
whether the predation case is a monopolization case brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act
or a price discrimination case brought under the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 222-23. One could
argue that this conclusion is only dictum because the Court actually ruled that the plaintiff lost its
case not because price exceeded cost (the Court upheld the jury finding that price was less than
cost), but because the plaintiff failed to prove the second necessary element of predation, the
reasonable prospect of recoupment of losses. Such an argument falls flat, however, because saying
that a prospect of recoupment is a necessary element presumes that there are losses to be
recouped. In short, the entire reasoning of the Court is tied to the idea that predation requires
below-cost pricing.
6. This proposition is quite radical in that even economists who believe that predatory pricing
is relatively common have generally been content to follow the courts in thinking that the key
element of predation is short-rn sacrifice by the predator, or even extreme sacrifice (selling
below cost). For example, Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan lament the courts' lenient treatment of
predators and see the problem primarily as a lack of understanding by courts of the myriad
plausible ways that losses can be recouped. Bolton et al., supra note 2, at 2263. They therefore
outline a variety of proposed elements for predation cases based upon different theories of
recoupment and cost measurement but stay within the standard Brooke Group paradigm in which
predation entails selling at a loss and later recouping the loss because of reduced future
competition. Id. at 2262-74. One recent paper by Spector also shows that above-cost pricing can
injure consumers in a differentiated products model by excluding a rival and lowering product
diversity. In his model it only lowers overall welfare, however, if the exclusionary pricing
involves a short-run sacrifice made in the expectation of future profits. Spector speculates that the
connection between "sacrifice" and lower overall welfare is a coincidence that would not
generalize to other models. DAVID SPECTOR, DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA OF PREDATORY
PRICING (MIT Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 01-10, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taPabstract id=262027.
7. Brooke Group was an oligopoly price discrimination case brought under the Robinson-
Patman Act. Lower courts have sometimes required a showing of pricing below cost in a
monopolization case brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act, but the Supreme Court has
never ruled on the matter explicitly in a Sherman Act case. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. FIT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983). The Court did nonetheless go out of its way in
Brooke Group to assert in dictum that the basic standards of judging predation were the same
under the monopolization ban as under the price discrimination ban. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at
224.
8. United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001) (holding that the
allegation of predatory expansion of flights amounted to nothing more than a predatory pricing
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that American Airlines had a monopoly over passenger travel into and out
of the Dallas-Fort Worth airport, or that it had or was attempting to acquire
monopoly power on particular routes.9 The DOJ showed that when
Vanguard Airlines began flying from Kansas City to Dallas at low fares,
American quickly matched fares, lowered prices by over twenty-five
percent, and increased the frequency of its flights substantially. Customers
saw little reason to fly with Vanguard, given American's response. After
Vanguard gave up, however, American raised its fares and reduced its flight
frequency."0 The DOJ made similar allegations with respect to attempts by
Sun Jet International and Western Pacific to enter the Dallas-Fort Worth
market. These facts alone, however, do not constitute a case of predatory
pricing under Brooke Group.
A successful predatory pricing case under Brooke Group requires
showing that American priced below its cost, and also that American stood
a reasonable chance of recovering the resulting losses.' American won on
summary judgment because the trial court found it was pricing above its
variable cost. This Essay argues that the two predatory elements isolated in
Brooke Group-below-cost pricing and the possibility of recoupment-
may be sufficient to make out a predatory pricing case, but they should not
be necessary.
American Airlines apparently had sufficient advantages to force
Vanguard to cancel all its nonstop flights between Dallas-Fort Worth and
Kansas City by the end of 1995 without pricing below its cost. 2 But does
this mean that customers were better off without Vanguard?
case and that American defeated allegations of predatory pricing because it priced above its
variable cost). The Department of Justice is currently appealing the case.
9. American carries seventy-seven percent of all passengers originating in Dallas-Fort Worth
who travel nonstop between Dallas-Fort Worth and another airport, and seventy percent of all
passengers who travel nonstop between Dallas-Fort Worth and another airport. Complaint T 20,
AMR Corp. (No. 99-1180), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2400/2438.htm.
10. This chain of events reflects a likely coordination failure by consumers. If most
consumers flew Vanguard anyway, all might have benefited from low fares indefinitely. Because
no single customer has any appreciable effect on Vanguard's long-term prospects, however, no
one acts to keep Vanguard in business.
11. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-24. The Court in Brooke Group did not address the
question of which measure of cost is relevant. It "declin[ed] to resolve the conflict among the
lower courts over the appropriate measure of cost" because both parties agreed that average
variable cost was the appropriate measure. Id. at 222 n. 1.
12. American has many advantages over entrants like Vanguard. To begin with, it has a
brand-name reputation that will draw customers at an equal price, or even a premium price, as
long as the premium is not too large. Thus, American can fill more planes in a given day than
Vanguard, which creates a positive feedback loop. By offering more flights per day, American has
an even larger advantage because of the scheduling convenience for passengers. In addition, its
extensive network of flights means that it can offer passengers free tickets to almost anywhere
through its frequent flyer programs. These frequent flyer tickets are valuable to customers but
inexpensive to American because they are restricted to American's least crowded flights. The
advantages of brand name, a convenient flight schedule, and a valuable frequent flyer program
mean that at an equal price to Vanguard, American's flights will be fuller. This in turn means that,
holding other things equal, American will tend to have a lower per-passenger cost because its
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An incumbent monopoly with a significant cost or noncost advantage
over entrants-a situation this Essay argues is common for monopolies-
can use these advantages to drive entrants from the market by pricing below
their cost, but above its own." As Part III makes clear, this strategy is quite
credible and effective. If the strategy is legal, higher-cost rivals will not
even attempt entry, and consumers may never enjoy low prices. If entrants
who would price below the monopoly are excluded from the market,
consumers are worse off than if the low-cost monopoly did not exist. 4 This
Essay calls such strategies above-cost predation and argues they should
violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The standard view of predatory pricing is stated clearly by Judge
Easterbrook:
Predatory prices are an investment in a future monopoly, a sacrifice
of today's profits for tomorrow's. The investment must be
recouped. If a monopoly price later is impossible, then the sequence
is unprofitable and we may infer that the low price now is not
predatory. More importantly, if there can be no "later" in which
recoupment could occur, then the consumer is an unambiguous
beneficiary even if the current price is less than the cost of
production.15
fixed costs will be shared over more passengers. American's hub in Dallas also provides
American with substantial economies of scope in scheduling flights and combining passengers
from various routes. For example, a substantial portion of the passengers on a flight leaving from
Dallas to Kansas City (the route Vanguard entered) would be filled with passengers flying to
Kansas City through Dallas, but originating in other locales such as Miami. Such "through"
passengers make up over fifty percent of traffic in major hubs. See Enforcement Policy Regarding
Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919, 17,920
(Apr. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Enforcement Policy]. If American can justify flying most of its flights
with its through passengers, then the cost to American of flying customers directly from Dallas to
Kansas City may be quite low, perhaps even as low as the extra fuel cost and meals. American
also enjoys substantial economies of scope and scale in its hub from scheduling airplanes and
crews. If a plane or crew is needed to fly to Kansas City at a particular time, it can be scheduled to
dovetail with any of hundreds of other incoming flights to Dallas. These various economies may
imply that even if American has relatively high costs per airplane and flight crew, it may still
enjoy low costs for the marginal or average flight, and very low costs for the marginal or average
passenger.
13. A monopoly with a demand advantage (for example, an advantage arising from network
effects, frequent flyer programs, or preferences for familiar products) may similarly price near
enough to its own cost to force rivals to sell at a loss if they want to offer an equally attractive
package of price and quality.
14. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 281 n.40 ("A plan to exclude competition by less
efficient rivals is not anti-competitive, and a plan to exclude competition by more efficient rivals
is doomed to failure."). Easterbrook's view that excluding higher-cost rivals cannot be
anticompetitive is surprising. Even if one takes the total welfare perspective, the model in Part IV
shows that excluding a higher-cost rival with the threat of predatory prices lowers total welfare
compared with exclusion by low limit prices.
15. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1989).
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The Supreme Court endorsed a more extreme version of this view in
Brooke Group in which today's profit sacrifice must entail actually
suffering losses, rather than simply failing to maximize profits.
This Essay presents a simple model in which there is no "later." The
incumbent monopoly is therefore unwilling to make any sacrifices, so it
maximizes short-run profits, but it does so with prices low enough to drive
out an entrant. 16 If the law fails to recognize these low prices as predatory
because they are above cost, consumers are the unambiguous losers, not the
unambiguous beneficiaries that Easterbrook and the Supreme Court expect.
Existing predation law means the potential entrant will, in fact, not enter,
and consumers will always pay high prices to the incumbent. The predatory
problem occurs not "later," after exit, but "sooner," before entry. The key
problem is ex ante. This shift in temporal focus is a critical part of this
Essay's argument.
Then-Judge Breyer cautioned against this approach and justified the
exclusion of above-cost pricing from predatory pricing prohibitions on the
ground that otherwise we cast away "birds in hand" in favor of more
speculative "birds in the bush." "7 One problem with this reasoning is that
the benefits of low pricing (the supposed "birds in hand") may only be
temporary if entrants like Vanguard or Barry Wright are driven from the
market. Of still more concern, if firms anticipate being driven from the
market shortly after entry, they will typically not enter at all. If this occurs,
even the transitory gains that Judge Breyer expected will not appear. Judge
Breyer may never get his "birds in hand."
In the spirit of Williamson and Baumol, this Essay proposes a
"dynamic" standard for adjudicating predation: In markets where an
incumbent monopoly enjoys significant advantages over potential entrants,
but another firm enters and provides buyers with a substantial discount, the
monopoly should be prevented from responding with substantial price cuts
or significant product enhancements until the entrant has had a reasonable
time to recover its entry costs and become viable, or until the entrant's
share grows enough so that the monopoly loses its dominance. 8 For the
16. Spector demonstrates a similar phenomenon in a one-period differentiated products
market. See SPECTOR, supra note 6.
17. Barry Wright Co. v. lTT Grinnell Co., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1984). Barry Wright
entered the market producing mechanical snubbers for nuclear power plants, but (after some
delays) lost its only customer, ITT Grinnell, to Pacific, which offered Grinnell a steep discount.
18. According to the classification scheme of Craswell and Fratrik, this proposal would be a
"dynamic" standard because it is focused on changes in conduct over time in response to entry
and exit. Richard Craswell & Mark R. Fratrik, Predatory Pricing Theory Applied: The Case of
Supermarkets vs. Warehouse Stores, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985). The dynamic
standards previously proposed by Williamson and Baumol are similar in spirit, but their specifics
differ in important ways. This proposal is substantially stricter than Williamson's and has a better
legal foundation and better economic consequences than Baumol's. See Oliver E. Williamson,
Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977); William J.
Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing,
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sake of concreteness in application, this Essay usually assumes that if an
entrant prices twenty percent below an incumbent monopoly, the
incumbent's prices will be frozen for twelve to eighteen months. 9 If the
incumbent does not observe these strictures, as American Airlines did not,
then the entrant under this proposal can sue successfully for predatory
pricing without the need to demonstrate below-cost pricing or the
opportunity for recoupment.
This Essay argues that this rule is a sensible interpretation of section 2
of the Sherman Act and that it is consistent with the basic thrust of
monopolization doctrine. This predatory pricing rule encourages the
incumbent to charge low prices from the start in order to discourage entry. °
Under this rule, if American Airlines, for example, had wanted to
discourage Vanguard from entering, it would have had to charge the low
prices that it ultimately used to drive Vanguard out of the market even
before Vanguard entered. Since it is never clear when an entrant will turn
up, American would have to charge low prices all the time. Baumol's
alternative predatory pricing rule, by contrast, which required price
reductions to be quasi-permanent, aimed to eliminate the high-price period
of recoupment. Baumol's rule would not provide any incentive to price low
before entry because it creates no link between post-entry and pre-entry
prices."
This Essay's predation rule means that matching competitors' prices
after entry (if there is entry) is no longer a cheap substitute for actually
charging low prices in the first place.22 If the incumbent's prices are still
high enough to invite entry, under this rule, firms will enter if they can
profitably survive while charging prices twenty percent below the
monopoly's current prices. The entrant would not have to survive pricing
lower than the monopoly could price in reaction to entry. Under this rule,
then, firms that would otherwise fear being driven from the market with
above-cost predation can enter profitably.
89 YALE L.J. I (1979). Baumol's and Williamson's proposals are discussed and compared to this
Essay's proposal in Part VH.
19. The exact operationalization of the rule (twenty percent threshold and twelve to eighteen
months duration) could vary by industry or be decided on a case-by-case basis. The price freeze
might also be adjusted for inflation in periods of high inflation or for substantial industry-specific
price trends.
20. Judges and commentators frequently justify restrictive tests for predatory pricing because
they fear that more inclusive tests would ban such limit-pricing behavior. See Barry Wright, 724
F.2d at 231-32; Philip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699-700 (1975).
21. Baumol. supra note 18.
22. For generally related arguments, see Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed- Low-Price Policies
Guarantee High Prices, and Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, III HARV. L. REV. 528
(1997), which argues that guaranteed-low-price policies are a good substitute for actually charging
low prices because committing to match price cuts discourages rivals from cutting prices and
preserves market share in the rare event that rivals do so nonetheless.
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Consumers get dual benefits under the proposed predatory pricing rule:
(1) Incumbents charge lower prices in order to limit entry, and (2) there is
more entry at whatever price incumbents choose than there would be at the
same price under Brooke Group. Not everyone benefits from such a rule, of
course. The incumbent monopoly suffers lower profits while it charges low
limit prices, and if entry does occur, the incumbent may be unable to
respond in a profit-maximizing way. The consumer surplus gains from low
limit pricing will generally exceed the losses to the incumbent before
entry." Overall, however, the social welfare consequences remain
ambiguous because if the incumbent's lower limit prices do not discourage
all entry, firms protected by the price freeze will sometimes enter despite
having higher costs than the incumbent. Consumers would receive a second
boon from the entry of these firms-since prices would be lowered-but in
some cases profit losses could exceed consumers' gains.
The proposal advances consumer welfare, which has historically been
the core goal of antitrust case law.24 It stands a good chance of improving
23. That is, when price exceeds marginal cost, a drop in price as part of limit pricing creates
net benefits because extra output is produced and sold with a value in excess of cost.
24. Many antitrust cases stress the primacy of consumer welfare. For example, the Court has
written that "the end sought was the prevention of restraints ... which... raise prices or
otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services,"
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940). Although Professor Easterbrook's
scholarship argues for a total welfare standard, Judge Easterbrook's opinion in A.A. Poultry
Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. asserts that a "[p]rice less than cost today, followed by the
competitive price tomorrow, bestows a gift on consumers. Because antitrust laws are designed for
the benefit of consumers, not competitors, a gift of this kind is not actionable." 881 F.2d 1396,
1401 (7th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court endorses this view in Brooke Group, arguing that prices
below cost are not problematic from an antitrust perspective, even though they are allocatively
inefficient, because such prices increase consumer welfare. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993). Hence, these prices are only predatory, and
only violate the antitrust laws, if there is the prospect of a later recoupment period when prices are
high. Id. The Court wrote that "[allthough unsuccessful predatory pricing may encourage some
inefficient substitution toward the product being sold at less than its cost, unsuccessful predation
is in general a boon to consumers," and for that reason does not violate the antitrust laws, Id. This
reasoning in Brooke Group was later picked up by the Ninth Circuit. Rebel Oil Co. v. At.
Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1433-34 (9th Cir. 1995). These arguments in favor of adding a
recoupment clcment to the "price less than cost" element implicitly presume that bans on
predation seek to protect consumer welfare, not total welfare.
Other antitrust cases and commentators also support consumer welfare as the primary goal of
antitrust. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997) (dismissing efficiency gains
that are not passed on to consumers); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68
(1982) (finding the major goal of antitrust laws to be the prevention of unfair wealth redistribution
"from consumers to firms with market power").
The claim here is not that low prices are, should be, or have been the exclusive goal of
antitrust law. Historically, the second goal of antitrust has not, however, been to promote low
costs, but rather to oppose concentration even where concentration might lower costs and prices.
Justice Brandeis, for example, argued that one can either have great concentrations of power and
wealth or democracy, but not both. See, e.g., JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE MORROW BOOK OF
QUOTATIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 48 (1984) (quoting Justice Brandeis's statement that "we
can have democracy in this country or we can have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a
few, but we can't have both"). In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court noted that "we cannot fail to
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overall welfare as well, a goal many commentators advance,25 although the
possibility of encouraging high-cost entrants could lower overall welfare.26
More restrictive variants might be more certain to improve overall welfare,
recognize Congress's desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small,
locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets." Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). The Brown Shoe Court previously had observed that the illegal
merger of Brown Shoe with Kinney would allow the integrated companies to "market their own
brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers." Id. Lower costs by themselves
have rarely, if ever, been the deciding factor in any case.
Others have also seen noneconomic political goals as relevant. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky,
The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979); see also Thomas J.
DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
73, 74-76 (1985) (interpreting the Sherman Act as interest-group legislation designed to transfer
wealth from big business to small merchants and farmers); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick,
A Frameworkfor Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 220 (1979) (arguing that
"[the primary objective of antitrust policy is to promote full and fair market competition and to
reap the benefits that competition brings with it"); David Millon, The Sherman Act and the
Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1287-92 (1988) (viewing the original purpose of the
Sherman Act to be the protection of democratic institutions from concentrated economic power).
25. Then-Professor Robert Bork, for example, championed total wealth maximization (the
sum of producer and consumer surplus) as the goal of antitrust, although he confusingly labeled
this goal "consumer welfare" on the ground that every producer is ultimately owned by
consumers. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 107-15 (The Free Press 1993) (1978).
Bork writes, "A consideration of the virtues appropriate to law as law demonstrates that the only
legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare." Id. at 7; see also id. at 51
("The only legitimate goal of American antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare.").
Richard Posner also embraces a total-wealth-maximization goal. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-22 (1976). Kaplow and Shavell support the
wealth-maximization goal for all law (other than tax law). See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
Despite the wish of economists and their fellow travelers that the goal of antitrust be to
promote overall efficiency, neither case law nor legislative history stands for the proposition that
overall economic welfare or wealth maximization trumps low prices. Despite the admittedly
enormous recent influence of economics on the courts, cases that take a position on the issue stand
for the contrary proposition. E.g., Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066 (refusing to count efficiency gains
not passed on to consumers). It may be fortunate in some ways that courts have not sought to
maximize overall welfare because once one widens the scope of antitrust concerns beyond prices
in order to evaluate overall social welfare, one confronts an impossible tangle of how to evaluate
social welfare or societal wealth in a world rife with market failures. Cartels and other antitrust
problems are by no means the only reasons, and not even the primary reasons, that prices deviate
from marginal cost. Unions, government regulation, environmental externalities, accidents and
other nonenvironmental externalities, search costs, agency costs and other cases of asymmetric or
impacted information, opportunism, and irrational decisionmaking all cause prices to deviate from
marginal cost. In such a world, even if one could be sure that a given antitrust rule would increase
producer and consumer surplus in one market, it might lower overall welfare because true social
costs do not determine supply in that market or one related to it.
26. Proper determination of overall welfare consequences should consider cases where entry
occurs because of this rule that would not otherwise occur. In such cases, overall welfare increases
because prices are substantially lower than they would be otherwise. Prices are lower, first, by the
amount that the incumbent lowered prices to limit entry, and second, by the entrant's discount,
which needs to be at least twenty percent to secure the price freeze. The reduction in inefficiency
from these low prices could exceed the social costs arising from inefficient production during the
post-entry phase. Even if overall welfare is lowered after entry, however, this loss should be
multiplied by the probability of entry and compared with the efficiency gains that arose before
entry, because prices were lower during that phase.
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but only by sacrificing some of the consumer gains from higher-cost
entrants.27
The rule advocated here also presents fewer administrative costs than
other "dynamic" alternatives. Areeda and Turner considered and rejected
one such alternative rule in which an incumbent monopoly could match but
not beat the prices of an entrant.28 They argued that such a policy would be
impossible to administer because of the great difficulty of distinguishing
matching from beating in common situations where quality and consumer
preferences are tricky to evaluate. 29 This Essay's proposal forbids price cuts
even when the cuts do not entail price-beating. The price freeze makes the
policy significantly more effective in that the incumbent will price much
lower to prevent entry because entry leads to such stringent restrictions. In
addition, the restrictions are somewhat easier to monitor than a quality-
adjusted matching restriction, because a temporary freeze on price
reductions or quality advances does not require a comparison of the
entrant's and rivals' products under some hypothetical consumer's
preferences. Nor will small errors in adjudication spoil the impact of the
policy. If the incumbent monopoly can get away with a small price
reduction or quality enhancement, this will not ruin an entrant's chances.
After all, to trigger the price freeze, the entrant must price substantially
below the incumbent.30 In contrast, allowing American to match
Vanguard's fares, as it did, when consumers have even a slight preference
to fly American, could entirely squelch an entrant's chances.
Part II explains and critiques existing predatory pricing doctrine. Part
III then presents a simple model with above-cost predation by a low-cost
monopoly. Part IV puts forward a typology of scenarios where allegations
of predatory pricing might arise and suggests that existing doctrine cannot
reasonably handle them all. Part V proposes a new category of predatory
pricing claim. Part VI compares existing doctrine with the Essay's proposed
rule in the model considered in Part 11 and illustrates the advantages of this
Essay's proposal. Part VII compares this Essay's predation rule to
proposals made by Baumol and Williamson. Part VIII applies this Essay's
rule to several concrete cases. Part IX concludes.
27. For example, a more moderate approach would require the plaintiff in a predatory pricing
case to prove that (1) it has sufficiently low cost and price to bring overall value to the market and
(2) it would likely not have entered if it knew the incumbent would respond as the incumbent did.
Such a standard allows the possibility of an above-cost predation case, but it only protects firms
whose entry improves overall social welfare.
28. Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 707-08.
29. If consumers are heterogeneous, the concept is inherently ill-defined because matching
for one buyer will entail beating for another.
30. Admittedly, the administrative gain from the restrictions being relatively easy to monitor
may be somewhat illusory because the twenty percent discount threshold to trigger the price
freeze should really be quality-adjusted.
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II. PREDATORY PRICING DOCTRINE
In this Part, I explain the state of current predation law, its rationales,
and how we got here. If a firm uses predatory pricing to maintain a
monopoly or in an attempt to gain a monopoly-the kind of predation I
consider in this Essay-it can be attacked under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. If the predatory pricing simply lessens competition without creating or
maintaining a monopoly, it may still be illegal if the predatory prices are
discriminatory-in that case, suits can be brought under section 2(a) of the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.31 Courts have
generally not distinguished between these two acts when deciding whether
prices are predatory. I argue, however, for a stricter rule against predatory
pricing in the case of monopolies, a rule that encompasses the possibility of
above-cost predation.
A. Monopolization Generally
From the face of the language in section 2 of the Sherman Act, the
statute might simply ban all monopoly. Yet, probably since Standard Oil
Co. v. United States,32 and certainly since Alcoa,33 all have agreed that
something more than monopoly is needed to fall within section 2's
prohibitions.'
A firm must do something bad to violate section 2. As stated in
Grinnell, monopolization entails the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market together with "the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historical accident." 35 Courts
focus on finding "exclusionary" practices that defeat competition on the
merits.36 Unlike the actus reus requirement in the rest of criminal law, this
requirement is almost entirely pragmatic.
31. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13. The
Federal Trade Commission can also attack predatory pricing under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, provided the alleged violation concerns goods (not services)
traded in interstate commerce. Pricing on such goods that would violate section I or section 2 of
the Sherman Act or section 2(a) of the Clayton Act will necessarily violate section 5 of the FTC
Act. Suits may also be brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act in cases of conspiracy. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
32. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
33. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
34. Some have, of course, proposed changing the law. For example, the late Senator Philip
Hart introduced a bill in the 1970s that would have made it no defense in a civil monopolization
action for a defendant to assert that its monopoly was "due to superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident." BORK, supra note 25, at 6 n.*.
35. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
36. Competition on the merits is one of the touchstone goals of antitrust, as it is thought to
enhance consumer welfare. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
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A simple static story that every antitrust teacher tells makes clear the
pragmatic reasons why monopoly per se should not create a violation
without allowing the defense of superior skill, business acumen, or the like.
If a firm achieves monopoly because its superior skill allows it to offer a
more attractive package than rivals-higher quality at lower cost-this is
no threat to anyone except to those rivals whose goods we are better off
without. Consumers benefit from the monopoly offering such an attractive
package.
In the standard view, superior skill will not confer on the monopoly the
ability to exploit customers by raising price unreasonably. Consider the
case where superior skill constitutes the ability to produce a homogeneous
good at a cost below that of rivals. If the monopoly raises price above the
cost of its rivals or potential rivals, then they will actively produce and sell
at lower prices. The monopoly may raise price above its own costs without
losing its monopoly, earning significant profits, but only so long as it does
not raise price above its rivals' costs and thereby invite their entry. This
limited profit-taking by the monopoly is neither unreasonable nor injurious
to consumer welfare, nor is it inefficient when compared to the practical
alternatives. As then-Professor Bork wrote,
If the leading firms in a concentrated industry are restricting their
output in order to obtain prices above the competitive level, their
efficiencies must be sufficiently superior to that of all actual and
potential rivals to offset that behavior. Were this not so, rivals
would be enabled to expand their market shares because of the
abnormally high prices and would thus deconcentrate the industry.
Market rivalry thus automatically weighs the respective influences
of efficiency and output restriction and arrives at the firm sizes and
industry structures that serve consumers best.37
If the monopoly charges a price in excess of its marginal cost, the
monopoly creates an inefficiency compared to an ideal world because
output is restricted. This ex post inefficiency, however, provides a return to
skill and innovation. Without a significant return to such innovations, our
economy would surely suffer from a pervasive deficit of skill and
innovations. Even if we neglect these innovation disincentives, courts might
still be unable to improve the situation because they are unsuited to the
price regulator's task of determining cost. Even administrative agencies
509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993); see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); Areeda & Turner, supra note 20.
37. Robert H. Bork, Separate Statement, Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust
Policy, ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Winter 1968, at 54.
38. 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 720a, at 254-55 (rev.
ed. 1996).
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dedicated to regulation have no miracle cure to the above problem. If they
set price equal to cost, firms have no incentive to reduce costs and
enormous incentives to misstate their costs through cross-subsidy or
accounting artifices.39
For good reason, then, monopolization under section 2 requires that the
monopoly retain or gain its monopoly power through some exclusionary
device other than competition on the merits. The question is when and if
price cutting should be seen as such an exclusionary device.
B. Predatory Pricing
Charging low prices would not seem to qualify as a bad act under the
antitrust laws. Indeed, low prices are the primary goal of antitrust, and
competition is properly seen as a means to the end of low prices.
The paradigmatic predatory pricing claim is that the firm charges
abnormally low prices in order to drive rivals from the market or to chasten
them. These low prices do not reflect competition on the merits. Rather,
they will only be available temporarily until the rivals exit-after that, the
firm plans to charge high prices.4" The challenge for courts has been to find
a way to distinguish anticompetitive low prices from procompetitive low
prices. Rivals will, after all, always complain about low prices so long as
courts will give them an audience. When setting a legal standard intended
to distinguish procompetitive from anticompetitive low prices, courts must
balance the possibility of being underinclusive against that of being
overinclusive. The probabilities of these two types of errors depend, of
course, upon the underlying plausibility of predatory pricing.
Since McGee, Chicago School critics have been quick to point out that
to drive out an equally efficient rival, the predator must charge a price
below cost, and that to do this, the predator must serve the whole market by
itself at an unremunerative price." Losses for the predator could be
staggering, while the prey could cut back its own output and limit its losses.
Critics like Bork have contended that if predation is possible at all, it
requires that the predator have a huge war chest. They further point out that
if the predator subsequently raises prices, the prey, together with other
rivals, can return in force. Bork, for example, argues that if rivals are to be
driven from the market, "[flosses during a price war will be proportionally
39. 3 id. I 720b, at 256-58.
40. See generally Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209; Rebel Oil Co. v. Atd. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d
1421 (9th Cir. 1995); Barry Wright Corp. v. 7 Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1984).
41. See John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J.L. &
ECON. 137 (1958). Plaintiffs avoid arguing that the larger firm is able to charge low prices
because it has low costs since this argument tends to favor the idea that the low prices simply
reflect competition on the merits.
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higher for the predator because he faces the necessity of expanding his
output at ever higher costs, while the victim not only will not expand output
but has the option of reducing it and so decreasing his costs." 4 2 According
to this view, we should not expect predatory pricing to happen very
frequently (recall Easterbrook's comparison to dragons), and, therefore, the
legal elements necessary to make out a predatory pricing case should be
very stringent.43
The Chicago School criticism, which emerged among legal academics
between the 1950s and the 1980s, was a reaction against the courts'
sympathy toward predatory pricing claims. Particularly galling were the
Robinson-Patman cases, which found liability for anticompetitive predatory
price discrimination without requiring probable or actual monopolization.'
In these cases, the low prices seemed more likely to injure competitors than
competition and consumers. Utah Pie is the leading example; today it
stands among the Court's most castigated antitrust opinions, as Brooke
Group and Rose Acre point out.45 Utah Pie, which dominated its local Salt
Lake City market, alleged predatory pricing and sued several national pie
companies that were making inroads into the Utah market. The price war
started by the national firms in Utah had a dramatic adverse effect upon
Utah Pie, as its share fell from 66.5% to 45.4% during the period of the
complaint. The Court agreed with Utah Pie that it was the victim of
predation. The price war did not, however, drive Utah Pie out of the market,
nor even make the firm unprofitable. Looking back from today's vantage
point, the facts suggest vigorous price competition that benefited consumers
in the short run and probably the long run as well. Lower court decisions in
Robinson-Patman cases in the 1950s and 1960s also seemed to protect
competitors, not competition.4" As late as 1989, the Robinson-Patman
precedents meant that even though Judge Easterbrook felt that Rose Acre
actually deserved an "antitrust medal" instead of a fine, he could not,
42. BORK, supra note 25, at 149.
43. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 264; see also Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy,
Rethinking Antitrust, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2001, at A22.
44. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967); Moore v. Mead's
Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
45. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993);
A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1404 (7th Cir. 1989).
46. See, e.g., Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir.
1959); Md. Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957). Even the decision in Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962), which famously asserted that "it is competition,
not competitors, which the Act protects," was only paying lip service to that sentiment. In fact,
the Court protected competitors in Brown Shoe. Even though the Court recognized that "[t]he
retail outlets of integrated companies... can market their own brands at prices below those of
competing independent retailers," the Court also acknowledged "Congress' desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses," even at the
expense of "occasional higher costs and prices [that] might result from the maintenance of
fragmented industries and markets." Id. Hence, the Court banned the integration of Brown Shoe
with Kinney. Id. at 346.
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consistent with these precedents, rule that Rose Acre's pricing was legal on
the ground that it was procompetitive.47 Instead, Easterbrook felt forced to
declare its pricing legal on the ground that it was nondiscriminatory
(essentially, a technicality).
The Chicago School's critique of predatory pricing cases was finally
heard loud and clear by the Supreme Court in Matsushitaa" and Brooke
Group. 9 If the critique had force when a single firm monopolized an
industry, it seemed damning in Matsushita and Brooke Group. In those
cases, even if the alleged predation were successful, many firms would be
left in the market. In Matsushita, this meant that competitive prices would
be likely after the predatory period, so the firms would find recoupment of
their losses impossible. In Brooke Group, this problem was accentuated in
the eyes of the Court because the alleged losses during the predatory period
were concentrated in one firm, whereas any unlikely gains would be
divided among several.
In Matsushita, the Court adopted the skepticism of Easterbrook, Bork,
and other adherents of the Chicago School toward the plausibility of
predatory pricing. The Court cited these scholars extensively, quoting
Easterbrook to the effect that "'[tihe predator must make a substantial
investment with no assurance that it will pay off."'"o The Court concluded
that "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful."'" Under the Court's analysis, predation by a single monopoly
firm is exceedingly difficult, much more so by a group acting in concert, as
alleged in Matsushita. The defendants won on summary judgment because
the trial court could not infer that the defendants would do something that
the Court thought economically senseless.
Brooke Group quickly followed Matsushita and laid down a test
intended to make a clear distinction between procompetitive and
anticompetitive low pricing. 5' Predatory pricing under Brooke Group
requires (1) below-cost pricing (instead of merely non-profit-maximizing
behavior) and (2) the prospect of recoupment of the resulting losses. Under
the Court's theory, banning prices that exceed cost would protect
competitors and deny consumers the benefits of buying at low prices, rather
than enhance competition or protect consumers from future exploitation.
The Court wrote:
47. Before finding the technical "out" that Rose Acre's prices were not legally
discrminatory, Easterbrook reasoned that the Robinson-Patman cases "drive[] us almost to the
point of reversing the district court" and ruling in favor of the plaintiff. A.A. Poultry Farms, 881
F.2d at 1406.
48. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
49. 509 U.S. 209.
50. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 589 (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 268).
51. Id.
52. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223.
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As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant
measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the
alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is
beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without
courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price cutting.53
The Court also quoted Cargill v. Monfort of Colorado, stating that
"'[t]o hold that the antitrust laws protect competitors from the loss of
profits due to such price competition would, in effect, render illegal any
decision by a firm to cut prices in order to increase market share,"' a
"'perverse result"' that the antitrust laws do not require. 4 The recoupment
element can be explained as a filter, so that in industries whose competitive
structure makes recoupment exceedingly unlikely, courts do not need to
struggle with the price-cost determination. This explanation does not,
however, explain why the prospect of recoupment could not be inferred
from a finding of below-cost pricing, such as in the jury finding upheld in
Brooke Group. Alternatively, the recoupment requirement might prevent
punishing firms that irrationally lower prices when recoupment is not
possible, or provide a backstop rule in case the jury or the court errs in its
price-cost comparison.
The Supreme Court in Brooke Group went out of its way to state that
the elements of a predatory pricing case are the same for a price
discrimination case under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act as for a
monopolization case under section 2 of the Sherman Act." The analysis of
the case of a low-cost monopoly in the next Part, however, suggests that the
Court's position is more tenable for the oligopoly case considered in
Brooke Group than for a monopoly case under section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
11. ABOVE-COST PREDATION BY A Low-COST MONOPOLY
This Part argues that in a market where a monopoly has cost or other
advantages over entrants, the Brooke Group rule could lead to adverse
welfare consequences. At worst, it could allow a monopoly to charge high
prices perpetually, never facing an entrant.
Economists such as Ordover, Klevorick, and Bolton, Brodley, and
Riordan commonly write that the "Chicago" view that price predation is
likely to be unprofitable is correct in simple market settings, but that in
more complex, realistic market situations, such as those with imperfect
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986)).
55. Of course, in a price discrimination case, the plaintiff must demonstrate price
discrimination, and in a monopolization case, monopoly power.
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information about costs or about market toughness, aggressive pricing can
yield significant long-run benefits to the incumbent firm.56 My view is that
one reason that two decades of information-theoretical results in economics
have not had as much influence on the courts as they should is that they are
relatively complex. 7
This Essay presents a much simpler explanation of why predation can
be profitable: When the incumbent has lower costs than entrants, it can
drive them from the market by pricing below their cost, but above its own.
Without any asymmetric information between the incumbent and a firm
considering entry, the potential entrant will not enter in equilibrium, and
predation never actually occurs.58 In this view, on the rare occasions that
courts observe predation, it is best explained as a mistake by the entrant.
Much of the economics literature is about understanding the nature of this
"mistake" and recasting it as a rational response by the entrant to a lack of
information about the market (e.g., low demand) or the incumbent (who
may in fact have lower-than-average costs). This Essay is not concerned
with modeling or understanding such "mistakes," but rather with proposing
a legal definition of predation that encourages entry whenever a firm can
give consumers a better deal than they are currently getting.
Below I present a model in which the incumbent has lower costs than
the entrant, and the entrant knows this. Predation occurs only off-
equilibrium under the existing cost-based interpretation of the Sherman Act
(i.e., only by mistake). In equilibrium, the fear of predatory pricing prevents
an entrant from entering. The predatory pricing definition proposed in Part
III, in contrast, protects the entrant and improves consumer welfare.
56. See, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover, Predatory Pricing, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 77, 79 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Alvin Klevorick, The Current State
of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 83 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 162
(1993); Bolton et al., supra note 2. For examples from the literatures to which they refer that
formally model rational predatory pricing strategies, see generally David M. Kreps & Robert
Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253 (1981); Paul Milgrom &
John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis,
50 ECONOMErRICA 443 (1982) [hereinafter Milgrom & Roberts, Limit Pricing]; and Paul
Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280
(1982) [hereinafter Milgrom & Roberts, Predation]. See also David M. Kreps et al., Rational
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982).
57. Klevorick demonstrates the utter lack of influence of modem economics on the courts by
supplementing his considerable reading with a search of all predatory pricing cases for the names
of prominent authors (Jean Tirole, David Kreps, Robert Wilson, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and
Garth Saloner) and for key words from this literature (deep pocket, reputation, signaling, and
asymmetric information), which came up empty. His search revealed no influence. Klevorick,
supra note 56, at 162.
58. This model is consistent with the Chicago School's view of the rareness of predation,
although it is worth noting that Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan have recently challenged the factual
accuracy of that claim. Bolton et al., supra note 2, at 2249.
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The model is a full information model with two time periods.5 9 During
the first stage, the incumbent monopoly chooses a price p,, cognizant of the
legal rule governing predatory pricing. Immediately before the second
stage, but after the first stage, a potential entrant decides whether to pay the
sunk costs necessary to enter the market and begin competing. During the
second stage, the entrant and incumbent monopoly both simultaneously
choose prices (assuming that the potential entrant in fact decided to enter).
Both the entrant and the incumbent produce with constant marginal cost
and no capacity constraints.
Define variables as follows:
Clo - the marginal cost of the monopoly incumbent;
p, = the stage 1 equilibrium market price;
p2 = the stage 2 equilibrium market price;
s = the sunk investment necessary for the potential entrant to
enter;
Cigh = the marginal cost of production for the entrant, ch,, > c
D(p) = the demand in either stage as a function of the lowest price
charged (all customers buy from the lowest priced
producer);
p_,p= the monopoly price that maximizes short run profits for the
monopoly incumbent.
Consider the equilibrium under existing predatory pricing law. If the
entrant decides to enter the market, it will be in Bertrand competition with
the incumbent.' The unique equilibrium has the stage 2 market price
P2 = c~i, with all output produced by the incumbent. (At any price above
Chi,, both the incumbent and the entrant would have an incentive to
undercut their rival's price and get all the demand. At the price P2 = Cih, if
anyone were going to purchase from the entrant, the incumbent could offer
a price slightly below c,, in order to attract that demand.)
In this equilibrium, the incumbent's low prices prevent the entrant from
making sales now and in the future. Is this predation? The answer depends
upon the meaning of the word "predation." In this case, the incumbent's
price p = c,,h exceeds its cost, c,, and therefore does not violate section 2
of the Sherman Act under Brooke Group. Since the price maximizes short-
run profits, it is not even predatory under the broader definitions of Bork
and Ordover, which include short-run, non-profit-maximizing behavior that
59. As with any formal model, I consider a stylized situation that ignores many of the
complications inherent in any specific setting but that has the advantage of allowing us to focus
attention on general issues.
60. See generally DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 272-76 (1990) (providing a background discussion of Bertrand competition).
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is only profit-maximizing because of deleterious effects on long-run
competition. 6' Nonetheless, this price cut is predation under the definition
proposed in this Essay.
Whatever one calls this behavior, if it is allowed, it will discourage the
potential entrant from entering, because if she does enter, she will lose her
sunk investment. In equilibrium, we will never observe entry or predation.
Entry, followed by the incumbent's reaction of driving the entrant from the
market with above-cost pricing, would only occur if the entrant made a
mistake.
Proposition: The unique equilibrium in this model involves the
incumbent monopoly pricing at p., during both stages and no
entry occurring in stage 2.
Predation in this model (unlike the typical view) involves no short-term
sacrifice. Since the predator's cost is below the entrant's at the margin,
since the goods are homogeneous, and since competition is over prices, the
incumbent's short-run maximizing response is to drive the entrant entirely
from the market. In many settings, of course, some short-run sacrifices
(even if not actually loss-causing) are required for predation. In such cases,
more future periods would need to be added to the model to rationalize the
behavior. The sacrifice would only be rational if the predator lessened
competition in the future (i.e., by convincing the entrant and other would-be
entrants of its toughness or its low costs).62 The lesson to draw from this
model, though, is that incumbents with cost advantages may find predation
rational and even short-run maximizing, even in a full information setting.63
Hence, it makes little sense for the law to focus exclusively on the failures
of incumbents to short-run-maximize, or, indeed, on extreme failures that
61. See Int'l Air Indus. v. Am. Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding an
exception to the Areeda-Turner rule in which pricing above average variable cost can be illegal as
predatory pricing if it is below the short-run profit-maximizing price and entry barriers are high
enough to allow recoupment).
62. Kreps et al., supra note 56; Kreps & Wilson, supra note 56; Milgrom & Roberts, Limit
Pricing, supra note 56; Milgrom & Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in INDUSTRIAL
STRUCTURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 112 (Giacomo Bonnano & Dario Brandolini
eds., 1990); Milgrom & Roberts, Predation, supra note 56; Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner,
Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
63. Contrast this result with the more traditional view of Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 24,
at 255, which states that "no practical way exists to distinguish a predatory price cut to a point
above average total cost from one that is a short-run profit-maximizing response to the growth of
competition." If a predatory price cut is one that injures consumer welfare, then this model shows
that this dichotomy-although standard in the predatory pricing literature-is a false one. It may
be better policy to deny the incumbent a short-rn profit-maximizing response to entry because
such a response can be predatory and reduce consumer welfare.
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involve losing money and pricing below appropriate measures of cost, as
required by Brooke Group. 64
Current law and most of the scholarship about predatory pricing have
focused on the tradeoff between encouraging low prices during the periods
when the incumbent competes with the entrant and the risk that prices may
rise in the future (an extended version of this Essay's model during stage 3
and thereafter). In contrast, this Essay suggests focusing attention ex ante
instead of ex post. That is, it suggests focusing attention on encouraging
entry and on encouraging low prices during stage 1.
The incumbent in the model has two cost advantages over the entrant.
First, it has already sunk the expenditure, s. Second, the monopoly has
lower variable costs. Only the first advantage is strictly required for the
result to hold. The second advantage, however, makes the result more
robust to relaxing other assumptions in the model. For example, the model
assumes that marginal costs do not rise no matter how much the monopoly
produces. If the monopoly has lower marginal costs than the entrant, then
the results will still hold as long as the marginal costs of the monopoly do
not rise too much. In particular, no matter how small s is, the results will
continue to hold as long as the monopoly's marginal cost when it produces
D(c,Sh) has not risen above the cost of the entrant, c,,,. The larger the barrier
to entry, s, the more the monopoly's marginal costs can rise along with
increased output without attracting entry.
A monopoly will often enjoy noncost advantages as well. Its product,
quality, and brand name may be familiar to customers, as in the case of
NutraSweet compared to generic aspartame.6" It may offer valuable
frequent flyer miles over a large network, as does American Airlines. Its
product may be more valuable because of other demand-side network
effects.66 Noncost advantages typically mean that a monopoly can out-
compete an entrant at any given price. Hence, as with a cost advantage,
entry may be pointless when the law only offers protection from below-cost
predation.
The potential problem of indefinite high prices would not exist if the
incumbent had several equal competitors who had already incurred the
entry cost, s, and could produce at c,. In that case, even without more entry
64. Even the proposed enforcement policy of the Department of Transportation under 49
U.S.C. § 41712 (1994), which was an attempt to state a nonpermissive predation rule for airline
competition, continues to focus on nonmaximizing behavior as the trigger for liability. See
Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation Industry,
63 Fed. Reg. 17,919 (Apr. 10, 1998).
65. See the discussion of Holland Sweetener and NutraSweet in BARRY J. NALEBUFF &
ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER, CO-OPETrrlON 72-76 (1996).
66. For example, Microsoft Word is more valuable to most users at this point than
WordPerfect, in part because it has a larger user base, which facilitates file exchange and
collaboration, as well as formal and informal technical support.
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we would expect competitive prices to prevail as competition among firms
drives the price down to c,,.
If the incumbent and competitors have capacity constraints, the price, p,
would exceed c,_, and, in the long run, the margin p - c, would
compensate firms for their investment in capacity. New firms would only
enter if they had lower costs of capacity or if their costs of operation were
below even c ,.. Such entry could trigger a price war and lower prices
toward, or to, cow. Although charges of predation could arise during a price
war, since an entrant will only be tempted to enter a competitive market
when it has some cost advantage, the law does not need to provide the
entrant any special protection.
IV. A COMPARISON OF PREDATORY PRICING SCENARIOS
This Part puts forward a typology of predation cases. The goal is not to
be exhaustive but to show variety and to suggest that a single rule-the
Brooke Group rule--does not fit all cases well. Each case is categorized as
"aggressive" or "defensive" according to whether the alleged predator is
the first actor, or is the second actor and is acting responsively.67
Scenario #1: Limit Pricing (Aggressive). In this scenario, a low-
cost monopoly prices low in order to limit entry. High-cost rivals
will decide not to enter and low-cost rivals will enter.6"
Scenario #2: Wal-Mart (Aggressive). A national chain like
Wal-Mart opens a store in a new locality and charges prices much
lower than those that previously prevailed. These prices drive the
preexisting stores out of business.
Scenario #3: Low-Cost Monopoly, or Monopoly with Other
Advantages (Defensive). A monopoly charges high prices. Another
firm, despite having higher costs or other disadvantages such as a
less desirable product, nonetheless can earn substantial profits by
undercutting these high prices, so it enters the market. After entry,
the incumbent cuts prices below its rival's cost and drives the rival
out of the market.
Alternatively, as in the model in Part III, the monopoly may
enjoy its position indefinitely without disturbance until another firm
67. Defensive low pricing is much more likely to be anticompetitive because it may substitute
for aggressive low pricing in the first place and will tend to discourage others from aggressive
pricing in anticipation of the response.
68. The low price might be a signal to potential entrants that the incumbent firm has low
costs, so prices are apt to be low after entry. Alternatively, in a full information context, the low
price might be set below the costs of most entrants so that they would not even consider entering.
The incumbent might worry if it set a high price that a later dramatic price drop in reaction to
entry could trigger a predatory pricing suit.
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with advantages emerges. Disadvantaged firms may realize in
advance that the high prices do not actually represent a competitive
opportunity if the advantaged monopoly is free to react.
Scenario #4: Same-Cost Monopoly Without Advantage
(Defensive). A monopoly faces a challenge from an entrant that can
produce a comparable product at similar or lower cost. The
monopoly attempts to drive it from the market with below-cost
prices. The entrant reduces its production to limit its losses, while
the incumbent must produce high quantities to keep prices low, and
so suffers large losses. Eventually, either the rival exits or the
incumbent relents and accommodates the entrant by reducing
output and letting price rise above cost.
Scenario #5: Oligopoly Discipline (Defensive). Prices are
relatively high and all firms are comfortable. One gets greedy and
tries to capture more of the market with low prices or some
innovation. Another firm, or the rest of the firms in concert, cuts
prices in an effort to discipline its rival. Although they have little
hope of driving the aggressor from the market, they do hope to
chasten its aggressive behavior and return to the prior comfortable
equilibrium.
A large fraction of the writing about predatory pricing seems concerned
either explicitly or implicitly with the same-cost monopoly scenario. 69 As
discussed earlier, this literature argues that the predator will face much
larger losses than its rival during the predation stage. In order to drive its
rival from the market, the predator must drive prices below the rival's costs,
and, if the rival has the same average cost as the monopoly, below the
monopoly's average cost as well. Because the monopoly has a larger
market share, its losses will be larger than those of the rival. The situation is
made worse for the monopoly, however, because in order to drive prices
down, the monopoly must increase industry output and supply anything that
the market demands that other firms will not supply. Given the below-cost
price that the monopoly seeks to maintain, the monopoly may wind up
producing most or all of industry output. Hence, the monopoly's losses
could far exceed those of its rival. Holding financing capabilities equal, the
rival could continue to incur losses (without exit) for as long as, or even
longer than, the incumbent. The rival will therefore not be quick to exit
permanently (although, as suggested above, it may temporarily reduce
output), because it will doubt that the predator will be willing to continue to
bleed red ink. If the prey feels this way, then the predator in fact has no
69. For example, most of Easterbrook's analysis explicitly concerns the case where rivals are
equally or more efficient than incumbents, yet his conclusions are stated for the general case.
Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 272-76.
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reason to continue to incur losses. If the predatory period needs to be very
long to drive the entrant from the market, a predatory strategy will be
unprofitable to the incumbent. A rational incumbent will usually appreciate
this fact and not attempt the predation.
Although not thoroughly compelling, this standard argument is
reasonable for the same-cost monopoly scenario.7" When considering this
scenario, then, two issues leap out. The first is that predatory pricing seems
unlikely to be attempted and still less likely to succeed. Second, predatory
pricing will not typically succeed in the same-cost scenario if the incumbent
prices above cost (certainly not if it prices above average total cost),
because the rival would have no reason to exit.7
A judge or scholar who reasons this way has several alternatives for
dealing with the low-cost monopoly case. The first, and often most
convincing, tactic is to ignore the possibility. Alternatively, she may assert
that, in general, rivals will have access to similar production technologies
and argue that antitrust policies should not be based on exceptional cases.
Another alternative is taken by Bork, who seems to embrace the
possibility of a low-cost monopoly, but argues nonetheless that the
predator's losses will be proportionally higher than its victim's.72 Since
Bork's argument continues to be cited favorably in recent court decisions,73
it is worthwhile to point out its lack of generality. Although Bork asserts
several times that "nothing [in this conclusion] depends on the exact
numbers," " in fact everything depends on the numbers he chooses. In his
example, to drive out its rival, the predator must incur losses 11.2 times
higher than its rival's losses. Under different cost assumptions in which the
70. Although this standard argument is reasonable, it is not thoroughly compelling in a
repeated game. In principle, even if two firms have equal costs, almost any outcome is possible
according to the "folk theorem." See DREw FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 150-60
(1993). The profits and output of one firm can be held arbitrarily low (even with prices still high)
if it expects that increases in its output will be met with a dramatic price war. The question
becomes whether such expectations are reasonable and likely.
71. An incumbent and smaller rivals or potential entrants might produce using the same
technology, and so have identical cost functions, yet very different average costs. Because
production is subject to increasing returns to scale, as more output is produced, average costs fall
In that case, the incumbent may price above its average total cost but below its rival's average
cost. The rival might take a long time to increase its demand to levels that would yield costs as
low as the incumbent monopoly. For this reason, the monopoly might be able to engage
successfully in predation with above-cost pricing. This situation is best understood as one where
increasing returns lead to asymmetric costs (the low-cost monopoly scenario). The lower costs of
the monopoly arise because the incumbent is well-established. In much the same way, the
Stackelberg leader in Spector's model can be viewed as having lower costs that derive from a
combination of increasing returns and its leadership role. See SPECTOR, supra note 6. Again, the
possibility of above-cost predation can be seen as arising from cost asymmetries.
72. See BORK, supra note 25, at 149-54.
73. E.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Ail. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).
74. BORK, supra note 25, at 151.
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monopoly has larger cost advantages, but with the same competitive price,
the predator need incur no losses at all to drive its rival out of the market. 75
As the model in Part II makes clear, above-cost predatory pricing is
quite possible if rivals have higher costs than the incumbent monopoly
(where predatory pricing means low prices that hurt consumers by limiting
competition).
Scenario #3 is probably substantially more common than Scenario #4.
After all, a firm rarely achieves monopoly without one or more advantages.
Any such firm probably has gone down the cost learning curve and
produces more efficiently than a newcomer. The industry may enjoy
increasing returns to scale or scope. The firm may simply have a first-
mover advantage and be able to hide behind entry barriers from start-up
costs. It may have figured out how to make a superior quality product,
enjoy demand-side network externalities, or simply have a familiar and
trustworthy brand like NutraSweet. Some advantage, or combination of
advantages, gives the firm monopoly power in the first place.
The very advantages that give a firm monopoly power can allow it to
drive out rivals without pricing below cost. Consider, for example, Barry
Wright.76 Pacific was the only domestic maker of mechanical snubbers for
nuclear power plants in the United States. Foreign manufacturers could not
sell in the United States, and hydraulic snubbers were a poor substitute.
75. Bork constructs an apparently convincing diagrammatic and numerical example to prove
his point. In his example, before the predation, the monopoly and its rival both sell at a price of
$40, with the monopoly supplying 8000 units and its victim supplying 2000 units. In order to
drive the rival from the market, Bork assumes that the predatory monopoly cuts its price to $20,
$10 per unit below the victim's minimum average variable cost of $30, and that the victim reduces
its output to 1000 units per week at an average variable cost of $30 per unit in order to limit its
losses. Because of the price fall, demand increases to 12,500 units per week, so the monopoly
must increase output to 11,500 units per week. As Bork draws the diagram, at this output, the
monopoly has average variable costs of $39.50, implying that it fails to recover $224,250 of its
variable costs. The predator's losses per week exceed the victim's by a ratio of 22.4 to 1, or 11.2
to 1 after Bork accounts for fixed costs. Id. at 151-52.
Despite Bork's assurances that the exact numbers do not matter, the numbers do matter,
which makes this example more rhetoric than argument. Bork draws cost curves that assume that
the incumbent monopoly firm has a cost advantage, but this advantage disappears when the
predator produces a lot and the victim produces very little. This factor becomes relevant because
the monopoly must increase production to effect its predator strategy. If we drew a slightly
different cost curve for the monopoly in Bork's example, our conclusions about losses would be
quite different. Suppose, for example, that the monopoly has a marginal cost of $5 per unit for all
units less than 6000, and $40 per unit for all units produced in excess of 6000. Suppose also that
the predator charges $25 per unit, where demand is 11,000 units. Now if the victim stays in the
market as Bork suggests, producing 1000 units, instead of the predator suffering losses far in
excess of the victim, the predator will have revenues of $250,000 (10,000 units multiplied by $25
per unit), exceeding its variable costs of $190,000 by $60,000. Since the victim of the predatory
pricing is suffering losses, and it knows that the predator is not, it may exit quickly. Hence, if the
predator has the cost advantage I suggest, then far from being implausible, the predatory strategy
seems likely to be successful. Bork is only able to conclude that predation is implausible because
he gives the predator a steeply increasing marginal cost curve, so that it has huge losses from the
predation.
76. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
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Barry Wright's costs would be much higher if it were able to make
snubbers at all, so Pacific's price cut was able to keep Barry Wright out of
the market even though Pacific's price remained above every measure of its
own cost. If the case did not fit into Scenario #3, it was only because
Pacific's price cut may have been before it was aware of Barry Wright's
entry plan, so that the case may have been closer to the limit pricing of
Scenario #1. Judge Breyer expressed concern in Barry Wright that if above-
cost prices like Pacific's could be predatory and hence illegal, such a rule
would likewise ban limit pricing (Scenario #1) because limit prices also
exclude rivals by deterring their entry. That concern would have been
addressed, however, if Breyer had ruled against Barry Wright on the ground
that Pacific lowered its prices before knowing of Barry Wright's entry
instead of on the ground that Pacific's price exceeded its own cost. It is the
timing of the price cut that separates Scenario #1 from Scenarios #3 and #4.
Similarly, timing separates Scenario #2 from Scenarios #3 and #4. In
the Wal-Mart scenario, the plaintiff is already in the market when the
entrant is accused of predatory pricing. As in the limit-pricing scenario, the
alleged predator is behaving aggressively. Ironically, for exactly this
reason, a rule of per se legality would be best. The behavior constitutes
aggressive competition, and the Chicago School analysis applies.
Customers gain, at least in the short run, from allowing the newcomer to
price aggressively, even when it drives competitors from the market. If the
newcomer achieves market dominance (monopoly power), this does not
hurt consumers, so long as it continues aggressive pricing (now limit
pricing) in order to maintain its position. If instead the firm prices high and
relies upon the threat of pricing low after entry to deter entry, we have
moved to Scenario #3, which this Essay argues should be the focus of
predatory pricing doctrine.
Scenario #5 could in principle present a problem for competition
similar to the one in Scenario #3. As with Scenario #3, the defensive
reaction may chill the first competitive price cut (by the maverick in this
case, and by the entrant in Scenario #3). Scenario #5 is essentially Brooke
Group, and many of the points the Court made in that case distinguish it
from the low-cost monopoly case, ultimately justifying the cautious and
noninterfering approach that the Court took in Brooke Group. First, when
there are many firms of comparable size in an industry, it seems less likely
that one would have such peculiar advantages that it could drive another
from the market without pricing below its own cost. Accordingly, the cost-
based test in Brooke Group seems sensible even in light of the arguments
put forward in this Essay, and the Chicago School arguments apply.
Recouping the losses incurred during the predation period would be risky at
best, as it would require coordinated supracompetitive pricing by several
firms. Moreover, if one firm incurred most of the losses, as Brown and
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Williamson allegedly did in Brooke Group, it would have to recover those
losses through high prices in only its fraction of the market.
V. A NEW CATEGORY OF PREDATORY PRICING
The critique thus far suggests the need for a new definition of predatory
pricing under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The purpose here is not to shut
down the existing avenue of proving predatory pricing (i.e., showing
below-cost pricing and the possibility of recoupment), but rather to create a
new one. I first discuss monopolization and then examine attempted
monopolization.
A. Monopolization
A good starting point is the often-quoted Grinnell formulation of
monopolization under section 2: the "willful acquisition or maintenance of
[monopoly power] as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historical
accident." 77 This is the basic formulation of monopolization that descends
from Learned Hand's decision in Alcoa that requires some exclusionary
behavior on the part of a monopoly before section 2 is triggered. As
discussed in Part II, monopoly status alone is insufficient for a violation."
Pricing below rivals' costs, from the moment they enter until the time
they exit, certainly seems more "willful maintenance of monopoly power"
than "historical accident" and should be illegal under Grinnell. True, this
strategy would only be effective for a low-cost monopoly or a monopoly
with particularly good products. However, if we consider the reason behind
the superior product exception, we will see that this exception does not
apply to strategic behavior.
Monopolies based on superior products or low cost paired with low
prices are legal because consumers benefit. If, however, these advantages
are not used for limit pricing as in Scenario #1 but are instead used to deter
entry and to retake a market after entry, then consumers do not benefit and
the monopoly should not be able to use its superiority as a shield against a
monopolization charge. A monopoly will always have to be superior in
some respects to keep its monopoly, but this does not make its actions per
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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78. Learned Hand is less than transparent about the particular act by Alcoa that was
exclusionary. His clearest assertion is that Alcoa doubled and redoubled its production or
capacity, precluding successful entry. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431
(2d Cir. 1945).
20021
The Yale Law Journal
se legal.7 9 Attaining or preserving a monopoly by charging prices lower
than other firms' costs generally benefits consumers and is
procompetitive. 0 On the other hand, a firm that preserves its monopoly by
charging low prices only when its rivals make the mistake of entering the
market, and only until they exit, denies consumers the benefits from
competition on the merits. Firms that could provide at prices below the
monopoly's going price do not enter, because they do not think the price
will stay at pre-entry levels after they enter. Customers are denied the
benefits they might get in the absence of the monopoly firm because most
of the time they must pay more than they would if the products were
provided by others. Note how different this situation is from the limit
pricing scenario or the antitrust teacher's illustration where a monopoly
with low cost prices slightly below its rivals' costs to discourage their entry.
In that case competition on the merits is not denied; the costs of rivals are
simply too high for them to attract customers.
These arguments motivate the following new category of predatory
pricing:
Proposed Category of Predation: Monopolization under Sherman
Act section 2 includes price reductions or quality improvements by
an incumbent monopoly in response to a substantial entry before
the entrant has had a reasonable time to recover its entry costs and
become viable. Essentially, this new category of predatory pricing
mandates a price freeze for an incumbent monopoly, where the
freeze is triggered by a substantial entry.
The general logic behind this idea is suggested by the critique in Part II.
If an incumbent monopoly can and will quickly reduce prices below an
entrant's cost so that the entrant cannot recover the cost of entry, then
potential entrants with costs above the incumbent's will not enter. Since this
pricing strategy allows a low-cost monopoly to maintain its monopoly to
the detriment of consumers, it should constitute monopolization and violate
section 2. Below, I briefly refine various aspects of the definition.
79. United Shoe's customers would likely not have agreed to such a wide variety of
contractual restrictions if United Shoe's machinery had not been superior, as Judge Wyzanski
granted. Furthermore, Wyzanski was convinced that these restrictions supported United Shoe's
monopoly. Hence, in a strong sense United Shoe owed its monopoly to its superior products. This
fact was no defense because consumers were not benefiting, or at least not benefiting as much as
they would have, had United Shoe been denied these strategic contracts. United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344-46 (D. Mass. 1953), afrd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954).
80. Here, I adopt Bork's definition of competition: "'Competition' for purposes of antitrust
analysis must be understood as a term of art signifying any state of affairs in which consumer
welfare cannot be increased by judicial decree." BORK, supra note 25, at 51. In this Essay,
however, consumer welfare is interpreted in the traditional way, as consumer surplus rather than
producer plus consumer surplus.
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Substantial entry. The reason to limit the protection to a "substantial"
entry is to encourage entrants to enter with gusto at low prices and high
capacities. In short, the requirement is to ensure that the entrant brings
consumers substantial benefits. Hence, a firm should qualify as a substantial
entrant only if it prices substantially below the incumbent and has the
capacity or the prospect of supplying a substantial portion of the market.
Without this limitation consumers might get little benefit from the entry
that this stringent predatory pricing rule protects because an entrant might
price only slightly below the incumbent.
Price reductions of twenty percent or more should automatically qualify
as substantial, provided that the entrant is not unduly limited in capacity."1
Entry might be held to be insubstantial if the capacity of the entrant is
severely limited and the entrant cannot supply a substantial portion of the
demand at its low prices. If courts sought to maximize total wealth (the sum
of producer and consumer surplus), they might require that an entrant show
not only that its prices were low, but also that its costs were low enough
that its entry improved overall welfare. This Essay presumes, though, that
antitrust's principal goal is to maximize consumer welfare.
Might price reductions of less than twenty percent qualify as
substantial? In some markets they should, and it would be reasonable to
decide substantiality on a case-by-case basis. One advantage of a bright-line
rule is that it would let incumbents know where they stand. Monopolies that
price only slightly above their average cost would be insulated from the
entry of higher-cost entrants if they could credibly convey a willingness to
price below the entrants' cost after entry, as illustrated in Part Ill. However,
these monopolies do consumers little harm and may enhance market
efficiency.
Monopoly incumbent. The new category applies only to monopoly
incumbents and envisions no new test of monopoly beyond those ordinarily
administered under section 2. Since this new definition of predatory pricing
is motivated by the likely possibility that a monopoly incumbent has a
variety of advantages over entrants, it might seem reasonable to limit the
81. The figure twenty percent is intended to balance the desire to encourage entry with the
desire that an entrant provide substantial benefits to consumers before it is protected. Naturally,
the exact figure involves some guesswork. The reader may wonder whether courts can create such
numerical thresholds, or whether that would require a legislative act. There is precedent for
introducing arbitrary but not unreasonable numerical thresholds without legislation in other areas
of antitrust. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (holding that
mergers leading to a greater than thirty percent market share create a presumption of substantial
lessening of competition); 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10,
1992) (creating a variety of arbitrary numerical thresholds jointly promulgated by the FTC and the
DOJ, which have been very influential with courts); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY (1959) (suggesting that twenty percent market share should be the line of
prima facie unlawfulness for mergers); George J. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust
Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 176, 182 (1955) (suggesting that shares exceeding twenty percent after
a merger be presumptively unlawful).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20021
The Yale Law Journal
definition to "incumbent monopolies with substantial proven advantages."
Two considerations mitigate against doing so. First, if an incumbent
monopoly genuinely has no cost or other advantage, the monopoly may be
contestable and the monopoly may price close to a competitive level
anyway, because entrants would be perched waiting in the wings.8" In that
case, no entrant could price low enough to trigger the price freeze. Second,
proving monopoly power already entails showing that a firm can profitably
raise prices above the competitive level. This generally requires a showing
or inference of substantial advantage, whether implicitly or explicitly.83
Potential advantages that create monopoly are many. The monopoly
may have lower costs than rivals due to an innovation or superior
organization. 84 The monopoly may enjoy increasing returns to scale or
scope, as American Airlines surely does at its hub in the Dallas-Fort Worth
airport. Experience in an industry is almost always an advantage and tends
to lower costs substantially (through learning-by-doing). Another advantage
for a monopoly is that it has already sunk whatever expenditures are
necessary to enter the industry." A monopoly may also enjoy demand
advantages owing to the familiarity of its products or network
externalities.86
Duration of the price freeze. How long must the monopoly abstain from
price reductions under this definition before the reduction ceases to be
predatory? One limit is implicit in the definition: only so long as the
82. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982) (giving assumptions under which the threat of hit-and-run entry
forces incumbents to price low).
83. This "showing" is often not direct in practice. As Areeda and Kaplow note, "most
judicial pronouncements on the proof of monopoly power embody little morc than a vague
perception that a very large market share sufficiently approximates total control to be fairly
regarded as a monopoly." PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 574 (5th
ed. 1997). The idea that a seventy percent or more market share would create a good prima facie
case of significant advantages and power over price is plausible. The elasticity of a firm's
demand, i.e., price sensitivity, is typically much smaller for a firm with high market share than for
one with low market share. A firm's elasticity of demand equals the ratio of the percentage change
in quantity demanded to the percentage change in price. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M.
PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 98 n.7 (2d ed. 1994). A firm with a 70% market
share that cuts its output by 10% cuts market output by 7%, ignoring the possibility of other firms
increasing their output. If the market demand elasticity is 1, price will rise by 7%. In contrast, a
firm with only a 5% market share could only raise price by 5% even if it stopped producing
entirely.
84. Some would argue that asymmetric costs, at Icast at the margin, are the only explanation
for why a firm with an eighty percent market share and a firm with a twenty percent market share
in the same market can both simultaneously decide not to increase output. Given the likely
difference in firm-specific demand elasticities for the same market demand, one should expect a
firm with high market share to have substantially lower incremental costs than a firm with low
market share. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Contracts with Lock-In, 79 AM.
ECON. REv. 51 (1989).
85. A famous economic maxim is that sunk costs do not matter. If a firm decides to enter, it is
true that its sunk costs of entry will not matter thenceforth. But, if a firm will not recover these
costs, then they will affect its decision before entry and prevent it from sinking them.
86. See the discussion in Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 24, at 228-29.
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monopoly is a monopoly. Once the rival entrant has made sufficient inroads
that the incumbent firm is no longer a monopoly, the incumbent is free to
compete.
Duration should also be guided by the rule's goal, to give entrants an
incentive to enter and allow consumers to enjoy the fruits of competition.
The standard "sufficient time to recover its entry costs and become viable"
might reasonably be replaced by a rule of twelve to eighteen months, with
exceptions for unusual industries judged under the old standard. If the
entrant does not supply all the demand at its low prices, this reason might
justify a partial removal of the price freeze, at least so that the incumbent
could lower price enough to fill unserved demand. (This exception would
not allow American to cut prices, increase flight frequency, and leave
Vanguard's seats empty, as it allegedly did.)
Administrative ease. One potential advantage of this new supplemental
definition of predation over existing ones is administrative ease. Comparing
prices to cost has proven very difficult for courts.87
Liability under this Essay's definition of predatory pricing is easier to
judge. If an entrant charges a price substantially below the incumbent's
price (I suggest twenty percent or more), this would generally trigger a
price freeze for the incumbent. Prices are more easily and reliably measured
than cost. If the incumbent charges a wide range of prices as airlines do, the
application of the rule is somewhat more complex, but not inordinately so.
The price freeze would translate into a rough freeze on average price, where
that average is weighted by sales.
The administrative ease advantage is bound to disappear somewhat in
practice, because courts will no doubt find it necessary to make allowances
for changes in cost, at least for dramatic changes in cost. For example, if
fuel prices fell by fifty percent, and Vanguard, in reaction to this drop,
entered the Dallas market at steep discounts before American had had time
to cut prices, courts might wish to allow American the chance to respond.
Likewise, if fuel costs fell after Vanguard's entry, most courts would be
inclined to allow American to lower its price in reaction to its cost
reductions, even if it could not in response to Vanguard's entry.
If antitrust were concerned solely with fairness to the monopoly, both
allowances should be made for cost reductions, at least when the reductions
are dramatic. But with consumer welfare as the goal, the case is less clear.
If courts insisted upon a price freeze even though costs fell before entry,
this would only encourage firms attempting the limit pricing strategy to
remain vigilant in keeping prices low. Such a reaction would benefit
87. Areeda, who proposed this idea in Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, later conceded that it
is notoriously difficult in application. Joseph F. Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in Mergers and
Joint Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 609 n.98 (1996) (citing 3 PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 715.2a (Supp. 1995)).
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consumers. The situation in which costs fall unexpectedly after entry is
murkier.
Regardless of whether falling costs are allowed as a defense to
accusations of predatory pricing, no great point of principle is lost if the
judgment is fairly rough and ready, unlike the price-less-than-cost judgment
in existing cases, which requires a fairly precise measure of cost. If costs
fell by a small amount, say roughly 5%, American Airlines might be
justified in lowering prices somewhat but should be forbidden from cutting
fares 25% to match Vanguard. If American's costs fell by 5% and they "got
away" with a 10% price reduction, this would be no disaster; Vanguard
would still have a substantial price advantage and good entry incentives. An
administratively simple and acceptable solution would be to disallow any
American price reduction unless it showed costs fell dramatically, where
"dramatically" meant an amount equal to or greater than the Vanguard-
American price difference, which must be at least 20% to trigger the rule at
all. Cost reductions this large are rare over short periods of time. With such
a rule there would be little fear of endless courtroom squabbles over cost.
B. Attempted Monopolization
Should the rule proposed here apply in attempted monopoly cases, as
well as monopolization cases? Attempted monopolization requires showing
(1) the specific intent to monopolize a market and (2) an exclusionary act
that (3) creates a dangerous probability of successfully achieving monopoly
power.88
To explore how the logic in this Essay should apply to attempted
monopolization, consider a firm with a large enough share of the market
that monopolization is a plausible threat, but with too many competitors
capable of expanding their output for the firm to be deemed to have
monopoly power. For concreteness, imagine the firm has a 40-60% market
share, and suppose that the rest of the market is split among firms with 10-
15% or less of the market. What keeps the smaller firms from expanding
their output? Most likely, one or both of two possibilities applies. First,
these firms may have higher marginal costs than the dominant firm and so
charge prices close to their marginal costs of production, making an output
expansion unprofitable. Second, these firms may not lower price and
expand output because they expect such efforts would be greeted with a
proportional (and therefore much larger) output expansion of the dominant
firm, together with a price cut, making the small firm's price drop
unprofitable. (Worse yet from the vantage of the small firm, the large firm's
response could be disproportionate.) The full answer is probably a mixture
88. See Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
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of the two possibilities. If the competitors' prices are only moderately
higher than the dominant fir's, then in a homogeneous goods market we
could only explain their low output by the threat of a substantial reaction by
the dominant firm should they expand output and lower price.8 9
The question for this Essay is whether the price reaction of the
dominant firn is predatory and anticompetitive only if it prices below its
own cost, or whether it could be viewed as an exclusionary predatory act
under section 2 of the Sherman Act if it is above cost. Certainly just such a
reaction will discourage smaller firms from pricing more aggressively (if
their own costs allow) and picking up market share. The reaction therefore
discourages the initial price cut, just as it discourages entry in the monopoly
case. If the other elements of attempted monopolization are satisfied, there
is no evident reason to remove section 2 liability simply because the firm
prices above its cost.
C. The Meeting- Competition Defense
The district court in American Airlines raised an interesting objection to
the Department of Justice's arguments that is relevant to this Essay's
proposal. Judge Marten argued that an accused predator could always
defend itself from section 2 liability on the ground that it only met the
competitor's price and did not beat it. Marten claimed that this meeting-
competition defense is "predicated on" the explicit meeting-competition
defense under the Robinson-Patman Act."
Elsewhere, I have argued that the meeting-competition defense should
not apply even under the Robinson-Patman Act when meeting competition
is the very act that the plaintiff claims leads to anticompetitive effects.9' In
such a case, it makes little sense to point out that the monopoly only met the
entrant's prices, and that this must therefore be procompetitive. Only if the
prima facie case is premised on something other than price matching would
pointing to price matching in rebuttal make sense.
Originally, Standard Oil provided the foundation for the purported
absolute defense of meeting competition under the Robinson-Patman Act.
In that case, the Court reasoned that the meeting-competition argument
89. Observe that if there is no threat of the dominant firm reacting with increased output, the
price elasticity of demand for a firm with a ten percent market share will typically be five times
that of a firm with fifty percent market share. Since the markup of a profit-maximizing firm (i.e.,
(price - cost)/price) equals the inverse of the elasticity, if there is no threat of reaction, then the
markup of the dominant firm would need to be five times as high as that of the small firm
(p - c)lp, which would indicate that the large firm has dramatically lower costs than the small firm
instead of moderately lower costs.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1994).
91. Edlin, supra note 22, at 563-65.
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made by the plaintiff was logically flawed. 92 In other words, meeting
competition was not a substantive right on its own that trumped
anticompetitive effects. Instead, it provided compelling evidence that there
were no anticompetitive effects. The Court imagined that meeting
competition would always constitute compelling proof of the lack of
anticompetitive effects.
In the context of above-cost predation, the fact that the monopoly's
price cut only met the entrant's price does not prove that this conduct
produced no anticompetitive effects. The price cut could still make entry
unprofitable even if it only met the entrant's price. First, at equal prices
most customers may choose to remain with the incumbent, because, for
example, it has an established record of quality, better name recognition, or
a more valuable frequent-flyer program. Even if business splits evenly at
equal prices, the entrant may lose money: The price could be profitable for
the entrant at high output, but not when the entrant must split the market
and cover its overhead from a smaller customer base.
Hence, even the threat that the incumbent will "meet the competition"
may be sufficient to cause firms not to enter a monopoly market. In
addition, if the incumbent cannot legally match an entrant's price after
entry, it will need to price lower before entry. According to the logic put
forth in this Essay, the ability to match prices may be the source of the
anticompetitive problem. It would make little sense, therefore, to shield the
incumbent from a section 2 attack via a "meeting competition" defense.
Because courts have long interpreted the Standard Oil case to create an
absolute defense of meeting the competition under the Robinson-Patman
Act, it may be too late to distinguish cases where meeting competition is
part of the prima facie case (i.e., part of the chain of arguments of
anticompetitive effects) from cases where it constitutes a logical rebuttal of
the prima facie case. However, no absolute meeting-competition defense
should be extended to section 2 of the Sherman Act.
To extend an absolute meeting-competition defense to section 2 of the
Sherman Act would perpetuate a substantial misunderstanding by the
courts. Courts generally see defensive acts as procompetitive and
aggressive acts as anticompetitive. Hence, a firm that suddenly cuts prices
below all its rivals' tends to be seen as predatory. Those who respond by
matching the price cut are seen as competitive. The truth, however, is
generally the reverse. In industries that lack strong competition and have
few firms-the industries where antitrust matters-the critical ingredient
for competition is providing sufficient incentives for some firm-any
firm-to lower price. Where competition is lacking we need strong
incentives to create the first procompetitive act. Reactions by other firms
92. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 246-51 (1951).
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only serve to diminish these incentives.93 Hence, this Essay focuses on
getting the incumbent to price low in the first place, or getting an entrant
who prices low. Allowing a speedy reaction by incumbent firms produces
less benefit than the first competitive act-and very likely involves a net
cost, if we take into account its consequence on deterring initial
procompetitive acts (i.e., entry).
VI. A PRICE FREEZE ENCOURAGES ENTRY AND Low STAGE 1 PRICING
A. The Case of Known Entrant Costs
Here I show that if a monopoly cannot react to a substantial entry, then
entry will be more likely, holding constant the monopoly's behavior before
the entry in stage 1. In turn, the monopoly will have strong incentives to
price low during stage 1 in order to deter entry. In short, the new category
of predatory pricing creates two major ex ante advantages for consumers by
making the market more contestable.
Consider the model in Part III, and assume that p, > 1.25c,-, such
that a sufficiently low-cost entrant could profitably enter at a twenty percent
discount and trigger the price freeze for the incumbent. In this Section, I
assume that the monopoly knows the entrant's costs. An entrant must be
able to charge a sufficiently high price during the second stage to cover its
sunk cost, s. Assuming, optimistically, that the entrant captures the entire
market, the break-even price b for the entrant is the minimum price at
which it can sell to the whole market and still recover the sunk cost s. This
price solves the break-even equation:
D(b)(b - chih) = S.
If the entrant can charge a price p > b and be protected by the price
freeze, then, it will find entry profitable.
Consumers should benefit under the proposed alternative predation
rule. Possibility I is that the incumbent monopoly invests in entry
deterrence. The incumbent monopoly could purchase full deterrence by
pricing sufficiently low during stage 1. Possibility 2 is that the incumbent
monopoly decides not to invest in entry deterrence and instead maximizes
short-run profits. In this event, the monopoly charges p_, during stage 1.
Consumers gain in stage 2 because if an entrant arrives on the scene, it will
decide to enter under the proposed rule and charge a sufficiently low price
to trigger the price freeze for the incumbent. Hence, under the twenty
93. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), stands out for
recognizing that a reaction of meeting-the-competiion can be anticompetitive.
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percent discount interpretation of significant entry, the entrant will charge
0.8p,o. (Technically, the entrant might charge an even lower price if its
profit function were not single-peaked.)
1. Possibility #1: Limit Pricing
The incumbent may find it profitable to deter entry by charging a stage
1 limit price p,~, such that
Phli, <: 1.25b.
Given this low price, the entrant cannot charge the break-even price b
and still trigger the price freeze so that she is protected. If she tried to
charge a price above b, there would be no price freeze, and her price would
be undercut in the ensuing Bertrand competition. If she charged a price low
enough to trigger the price freeze, she wouldn't recover her sunk cost, s.
Hence any price less than 1.25b is a limit price.
In this scenario, the alternative predation rule yields the benefit that the
incumbent charges a limit price of P,,., as long as the incumbent is
threatened with entry.94 Provided that the entrant has sufficiently low costs
(i.e., c ,h and s are sufficiently low), then this limit price will be less than
the monopoly price p,.., and typically will equal 1.25b.
Consumers will therefore benefit from the proposed predation rule, and
social welfare will rise as consumers buy more at the low price and output
expands. If the entrant's costs are too high, the proposed rule yields no
benefits.
2. Possibility #2: Entry
The second possibility is that the monopoly chooses the stage 1 price to
exceed 1.25b. If p, > 1.25b, entry will occur, and the incumbent will only
profit during stage 1. As long as the incumbent deters no entry, she might as
well charge the monopoly price Pmo,. The high price, together with the
proposed predatory pricing rule, will lead to entry during stage 2. The
entrant can choose its most profitable price between b and 0.8p., and still
be protected by the price freeze. The current predatory pricing rule, in
contrast, does not facilitate entry because the entrant could be driven from
the market with above-cost pricing without creating a valid predatory
pricing claim.
94. In practice, limit pricing might not occur only during stage 1. If we leave the two-stage
case, then limit pricing, and its attendant benefits, might continue forever.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
(Vol. I111: 94 1
Above-Cost Predatory Pricing
Consumers benefit from the entry because they can buy at a price
between b and 0.8p,,. Although consumer surplus increases, producer
surplus decreases. The effect on overall social welfare is ambiguous
because production is now done by the high-cost entrant instead of by the
incumbent. Still, the entrants' costs cannot be too high, because b <
0.8po,. As I have argued, to the extent that the goal of antitrust is
competition and low prices, the proposed predation rule has served the
purpose, even if overall social welfare may have fallen. Moreover, if we
extended the analysis to later stages when the incumbent is allowed to begin
vigorous competition again, we would expect price to be driven down
farther to p = ci,h, or, if the entrants learned the "secret" of the incumbent's
low costs, even to p = c,- .95
The consumer gains from entry and competition would be impossible to
attain were it not for the protection afforded by the price freeze under the
proposed predation rule.
3. Comparison of Possibilities #1 and #2
Suppose that entrant costs are high, so that the break-even price b is
high. Limit pricing will then be attractive, because very little short-run
profit needs to be sacrificed to prevent entry and preserve stage 2 profits.
On the other hand, as costs fall and as the break-even price b falls,
possibility #2 will be increasingly attractive to the incumbent monopoly.
Even for very low-cost entrants, however, the monopoly may still opt for
limit pricing. Consider the extreme case, for example, where the incumbent
monopoly has no advantage and b = c,,.
Let q be the probability that a potential entrant appears during stage 2,
let ;r, = D(P,,.,,)(P,, - c, ) denote the profits from charging the limit price,
and let 7o, = D(P_,)(P- c,,) denote the profits from charging the
95. " Learning by doing" is common in many industries, so it is quite possible that after the
entrant produces for a little while, its costs will fall to c,. See THOMAS R. GULLEDGE &
NORMAN K. WOMER, THE ECONOMICS OF MADE-TO-ORDER PRODUCTON (1986); Armen
Alchian, Reliability of Progress Curves in Airframe Production, 31 ECONOMETRICA 679 (1963);
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, 29 REv. ECON. STUD. 155
(1962); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Learning-hy-Doing, Market Structure and Industrial
and Trade Policies, 40 OXFoRD ECON. PAPERS 246 (1988); M. Thrse Flaherty, Industry
Structure and Cost-Reducing Investment, 48 ECONOMETRICA 1187 (1980); Drew Fudenberg &
Jean Tirole, Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance, 14 BELL J. ECON. 522 (1983); Pankaj
Ghemawat & A. Michael Spence, Learning Curve Spillovers and Market Performance, 100 Q.J.
ECON. 839 (1985); Douglas A. Irwin & Peter J. Klenow, Learning by Doing Spillovers in the
Semiconductor Industry, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1201 (1994); Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The
Effects of Technological Change, Experience, and Environmental Regulation on the Construction
Cost of Coal-Burning Generating Units, 16 RAND J. ECON. 1 (1985); Marvin B. Lieberman, The
Learning Curve and Pricing in the Chemical Processing Industries, 15 RAND J. ECON. 213
(1984); William W. Nye, Firm Specific Learning-by-Doing in Semiconductor Production: Some
Evidence from the 1986 Trade Agreement, 11 REV. INDUS. ORG. 383 (1996).
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monopoly price. Then, under limit pricing, the incumbent earns i;,,, during
the period of limit pricing (stage 1) and f;,o during stage 2, where f < 1
represents the discount factor used to discount future returns and yield
present value. 6 In contrast, if it opts for short-run profit maximization, the
incumbent will earn ir -P from stage 1 and ft1 - q)ir P from stage 2, where
1 - q is the probability that the incumbent is lucky and no entrant
materializes. The decision to practice limit pricing can be thought of as a
period of investment yielding later return, much as predatory pricing is
normally conceptualized. The firm invests
7;- - 1.
by forgoing short run profits, and realizes
fnr -f(1 - q);ro, =fqr,-P
from higher expected stage 2 profits. Comparing the investment with its
return, we see that limit pricing is the best course if
(I - fq)i;o, <  r,"
If demand is price-insensitive, so that z oP is very high, and the
monopoly price far exceeds the limit price, then possibility #2 will seem
more attractive. Likewise, if the probability that a potential entrant
materializes, q, is sufficiently low, or the firm is quite impatient, so thatf is
low, then short-run profit maximization, i.e., possibility #2, will be
attractive. Otherwise, limit pricing will seem more attractive.
Hence, the new category of predatory pricing gives consumers one of
two ex ante benefits in this case: (1) limit pricing or (2) entry and low stage
2 pricing. In general, as we shall see, consumers should enjoy some of each
benefit.
96. The value today of a future payoff is called the present discounted value of that payoff.
Since many economic problems require comparing amounts of money at different points in time,
it is necessary to bring all future money figures to the present. For example, in a typical
benefit/cost analysis of a construction project, one has to compare the current year's construction
costs with future years' monetary benefits and maintenance costs. To address these comparisons,
we ask the question: "How much is a dollar to be received in the future worth today?" Note that
$1 received today can be put in a bank to earn interest, at rate r per period. Thus this period's $1
will become $1 x( + r) at the beginning of next period. Equivalently, $1 received at the
beginning of the next period is worth only $ 11(1 + r) today. By letting f= 1/(1 + r), we can see
that a payoff of ir to be received next period is worth only fir now. In this terminology, fir is the
present discounted value today of a payoff of ir next period. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL
L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 542-45 (5th ed. 2001).
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B. The Case of Unknown Entrant Costs
In most realistic cases, the incumbent will not know the costs Chigh and s
of potential entrants who may come along during stage 2. As a
consequence, the incumbent monopoly will not know how low it needs to
price in order to limit entry. It must guess. In such cases, the incumbent
monopoly will generally price lower during stage 1 than under the Brooke
Group rule because, in addition to the benefit of increasing current demand,
the firm has a new benefit from a price cut that it did not have before: Low
stage I prices limit entry. (Under the Brooke Group rule, the threat of low
prices during stage 2 is sufficient to limit entry.)
Under the proposed rule, the incumbent monopoly will choose a price
p < p,,o that balances short-run profits against the long-run profits from
entry deterrence. Potential entrants with costs low enough to allow them to
enter profitably while pricing at 0.8p will do so and will take advantage of
the shelter from the new predation law.
When a low-cost entrant materializes, consumers will get the additional
benefit of entry: typically, prices of 0.8p, during the price freeze and even
lower prices in any subsequent competition beyond stage 2, when the price
freeze is removed. Even if no entrant emerges, consumers will benefit from
the incumbent's limit pricing.
This model illustrates the dual advantages of the proposed predation
rule: It encourages low pricing to deter entry and simultaneously
encourages entry by any firm that can bring substantial value to consumers.
What is lost is the potential for immediate, vigorous competition following
entry. If significant entry were common without the protection of the price
freeze outlined in Part III, then consumers may lose from the new rule.
However, in the case of an incumbent that has maintained a large enough
market share and has been judged to have sufficient advantages or
immunity to satisfy the first prong of the Grinnell monopolization test
(monopoly power), getting sufficient entry and getting low prices in the
absence of entry are probably the two biggest problems. Vigorous
competition after entry seems only an added nicety, one reasonably well
addressed by the requirement that the entrant attest to its merit and
seriousness by pricing at least twenty percent below the incumbent and
showing sufficient capacity to satisfy the demand. A period of limited
protection for the entrant may also lead to more serious long-run
competition because it may give the entrant time to move along the learning
curve and to establish itself in the market.
The model has also demonstrated that low pricing may be
anticompetitive even when price exceeds all measures of cost and even
when prices are in fact short-run profit-maximizing.
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This observation suggests that courts and commentators should cease
their exclusive focus on deviations from short-run maximization as an
element of a predation case. Deviations from maximization do suggest that
anticompetitive results are apt to materialize in the future and that long-run
lessening of competition is what motivates a firm to deviate from profit
maximization today. However, low prices can be profit-maximizing and
still injurious to competition. If the goal of antitrust is consumer welfare,
then the inquiry should focus on that goal, not on whether a firm is
maximizing profits in the short run.
VII. COMPARISON WITH OTHER DYNAMIC PREDATION STANDARDS
As discussed in the Introduction, both Baumol and Williamson have
proposed dynamic predatory pricing standards that base liability on
comparisons of a firm's behavior over time rather than a comparison of
price and cost. They are thus quite similar in spirit to this Essay's proposal.
Baumol proposed that once a firm cuts its price, the price cut should be
permanent, so that the firm could not hope to profit later from a higher
price." (Because we live in a dynamic, ever-changing world, he proposes
making the price restrictions quasi-permanent.) Like this Essay's rule,
Baumol's proposal seeks to prohibit the dynamic pricing pattern of
predation-high prices in stage 1, low prices after entry in stage 2, and then
high prices in stage 3. The difference is that liability under Baumol's rule is
triggered by the price rise in stage 3 rather than the price cut in stage 2.
Since the principal objective of antitrust law is to keep prices down,
Baumol's proposal may seem like an ideal trigger for liability. In fact,
however, raising prices has long been considered unproblematic from an
antitrust perspective.9 8 This is because the statute bans "monopolization,"
and high prices do not keep rivals out or promote monopoly; rather, high
prices actually invite entry. Since monopolization has historically been
interpreted as the exclusion of rivals rather than the enjoyment of monopoly
profits, this Essay's proposal has a better legal foundation than Baumol's.
The price cut after entry is exclusionary, and using it as the liability trigger
is more in line with precedent.
The rule proposed in this Essay also has advantages over Baumol's in
terms of economic consequences. First, his rule does not provide the entrant
as much protection as this Essay's rule. Although Baumol's rule may
sometimes discourage the incumbent from sacrificing in order to drive
97. Baumol, supra note 18.
98. See e.g., 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 38, 720a, at 254-55; see also Chi.
Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996) (overturning a decision that the
NBA's telecast fees were too high and noting that "the antitrust laws do not deputize district
judges as one-man regulatory agencies").
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entrants out (because the sacrifice would be quasi-permanent), the
incumbent preserves this price-cutting option and may choose to cut prices.
If we analyze the model presented in this Essay under Baumol's proposed
rule, we find that the incumbent would exercise the price-cutting option
during stage 2 and drive the rival from the market, because that action is
profit-maximizing and involves no sacrifice. Hence, this Essay's rule
encourages more entry at any given stage 1 price, because the price-cutting
option disappears.
This Essay's rule also encourages lower stage 1 pricing (limit pricing).
Baumol's rule gives the incumbent no incentive to price low in stage 1 to
discourage entry because the rule creates no link between stage 2 prices and
stage 1 prices. Under Baumol's rule, an entrant's decision will be based
upon stage 2 prices (after entry), not stage 1 prices (before entry). In the
model analyzed here, Baumol's rule performs exactly like the Brooke
Group rule. The incumbent charges monopoly prices during stage 1, the
entrant does not enter during stage 2 because it will be undercut if it does,
and the incumbent is again left alone in the market during stage 2, able to
charge monopoly prices.
In other settings, Baumol's rule does, of course, have some advantages
over the Brooke Group rule. The virtue of Baumol's rule is that if prices are
cut by the incumbent in stage 2, consumers can enjoy low prices on a quasi-
permanent basis. In some settings, the quasi-permanence of price cuts will
lead to more caution and higher incumbent prices in response to entry as
compared with the Brooke Group rule. This effect will tend to encourage
entry, although less than under this Essay's rule. Again, Baumol's proposal
gives no incentive to charge low limit prices during stage 1, so if entry does
not materialize (as it will not in his model), consumers gain nothing from
the Baumol rule. The Baumol rule suffers the same problem as Brooke
Group: the possibility of continuous high prices without entry. Like the
Brooke Group rule, Baumol's rule may encourage more post-entry
competition. As this Essay has argued, however, the biggest problems in
monopoly markets involve getting low prices before substantial entry and
getting substantial entry, not assuring some level of post-entry
competition.99
Williamson's predation standard is closer to this Essay's proposal: He
proposes prohibiting the incumbent from expanding output for twelve to
eighteen months in response to entry. 1°° This rule, like the rule proposed
here, encourages lower pricing before entry because reactions are restricted.
Williamson's rule also encourages entry because it restricts the incumbent's
99. Moreover, the comparison of post-entry competition is ambiguous, because this Essay's
threshold for the price freeze encourages low post-entry pricing.
100. Williamson, supra note 18, at 294-96.
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freedom to react. However, neither of these two beneficial effects will be as
large under Williamson's rule as under this Essay's rule, because
Williamson's rule allows the incumbent to lower prices after entry.
Williamson's rule also does not condition protection upon the substantiality
of entry (e.g., the entrant offering a twenty percent price discount), so an
entrant may be more likely to duck just under the monopoly price umbrella
without offering substantial benefits to consumers, as this Essay's rule
requires in order to trigger protection.
VIII. APPLICATIONS AND REFINEMENTS OF THE PROPOSED
PREDATORY PRICING RULE
Applications of the proposal in Part HI will necessarily come less neatly
packaged than the model in Part IV. This Part discusses how the proposed
predation rule might play out in several concrete settings and argues that, in
most of them, the rule has the potential to benefit consumers.
A. Northwest Airlines and Reno Air
Northwest Airlines has a major hub in Minneapolis-St. Paul. In 1993, it
enjoyed a hub premium of 21%.o' Northwest had once serviced the Reno-
Minneapolis route but had ceased doing so in late 1991. Reno Air began
operations in July 1992 and developed routes between Reno and several
major West Coast cities. On February 10, 1993, Reno Air announced that
on April 1 it would begin three daily nonstop flights between Reno and
Minneapolis. This proved to be a big mistake. Reno Air would then be
flying from major West Coast cities to Minneapolis in competition with
Northwest. On February 11, the next day, Northwest announced that three
daily nonstops of its own'between Reno and Minneapolis would also begin
on April 1. On February 12, Northwest announced that on April 1 it would
also begin daily nonstops from Reno to Los Angeles, Seattle, and San
Diego-routes that Northwest had not previously served but that competed
directly with Reno Air's mini-hub in Reno. Northwest also promised Reno
residents bonus frequent flyer miles on these routes and gave travel agents
special incentives to book passengers on Northwest. °2 On February 14, as a
101. See Severin Borenstein, Presentation to the TRB Study Committee on Airline
Competition tbl.2 (Jan. 21, 1999), reprinted in CLINTON V. OSTER, JR. & JOHN S. STRONG,
PREDATORY PRACTICES IN THE US AIRLINE INDUSTRY 33 tbl.6 (2001), http://152.119.239.10/
docimages/pdf59/121516_web.pdf.
102. These incentives, called Travel Agent Commission Overrides, or TACOs, are typically
not disclosed to passengers but give agents substantial incentives to steer passenger purchases.
OSTER & STRONG, supra note 101, at 8 n.6. After objections from the Department of
Transportation to the plan of a mini-hub in Reno, Northwest cancelled the continuing flights to the
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Valentine's Day present to Reno Air, Northwest announced fares to match
Reno Air's fare from Reno to Minneapolis and also announced sharp fare
reductions on nonstop flights between Minneapolis and Los Angeles, San
Francisco, San Diego, Seattle, Ontario (California), and Portland, so that
fares for these flights were the same as Reno Air's fares for connecting
service. (Northwest's fares had been roughly $200 to Seattle and $250 to
the other cities, and it dropped them to roughly $150 each way.) Reno Air
stubbornly began service on April 1 as planned, but after two months of
losses it cut service on the Reno-Minneapolis route to one flight a day on
May 20 and none after June 1, 1993. Following Reno's exit, Northwest
brought its fares from Minneapolis to the West Coast cities back up over
the next few quarters, eventually to levels in excess of what they had been
initially."°3 By 1994 Northwest's overall hub premium in Minneapolis had
increased to 42%.1"
Was Northwest pricing below an appropriate measure of costs as
required for predation by Brooke Group? The answer might be simply
"no" if $150 is above Northwest's fully allocated cost. Alternatively, fully
allocated costs could be in excess of $150, but it is very difficult to prove in
court that $150 each way is less than an appropriate measure of variable or
marginal cost. There are often good arguments that the marginal cost of an
extra passenger could be close to zero (meals plus ticketing plus extra fuel).
It seems likely, however, that Northwest's tactics hurt consumers. If
Northwest had not responded by entering the Reno-Minneapolis market and
had kept fares at $250 for direct flights to the West Coast, travelers between
Minneapolis and the coast could have chosen between direct flights on
Northwest for $250 or connecting Reno Air flights for $150. True,
Minneapolis customers did get a few months of flying direct for $150, but
ultimately fares rose beyond $250. Moreover, hub premiums from
Minneapolis increased by 21% to 42%, which was plausibly due to the
demonstration effect of Reno Air. °5
The proposed Department of Transportation (DOT) enforcement policy
for unfair exclusionary practices under its unfair competition statute would
create a broader test. DOT would only have to show that Northwest had a
dramatic departure from profit maximization (not that it actually lost
money) in order for Northwest to be guilty of unfair competition. 0 6 But
three West Coast cities from Reno. See Administration Warns Airlines It Will Enforce Federal
Antitrust Laws, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., Apr. 5, 1993, at 7A.
103. See OSTER & STRONG, supra note 101, at 7-9.
104. Oster and Strong's hub premium calculations control for flight mileage and market
density. Id. at 32.
105. It is unclear why Northwest's hub premium went up. Since it is a premium over other
fares, general fare increases cannot explain it. Also, other hub premiums did not increase by
similar amounts.
106. Enforcement Policy, supra note 12.
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what if Northwest's response was profit-maximizing even in the short run,
as in the model of Part IV? Suppose that Northwest made more money in
the short run by matching Reno Air's fares and also enjoyed the long-run
benefits of both reduced competition -on flights to the West Coast and
reduced entry on other routes. Are consumers not equally injured regardless
of whether Northwest's strategy is profit-maximizing in the long run or in
the short run as well?
10 7
Suppose instead that Reno Air could bring a case under this Essay's
interpretation of section 2. To do so, Reno Air would point to Northwest's
enormous market share of flights between Minneapolis and West Coast
cities in order to establish that Northwest was a monopoly. Reno would
show that Northwest had monopoly power in its hub' ° and was able to raise
prices 21% above competitive levels before the predation and 42%
afterward, according to Borenstein's empirical evidence." ° Finally, Reno
Air would show that it began to serve routes between West Coast cities and
Minneapolis at fares 25-40% below Northwest's average prices."0 For
many passengers, these fares would probably qualify as 20% discounts
despite the potential quality difference between Northwest and Reno Air,
although some evidence on consumer preferences and choices would be
helpful on this point.
If these fares did not represent a 20% quality-adjusted discount, Reno
Air probably would have lowered its fares somewhat more-another boon
for consumers. Reno Air would have been able to charge these low fares
without Northwest's response for twelve to eighteen months, so customers
could have enjoyed low fares for much longer than they did. Reno Air
might have developed enough of a consumer base that it could compete
with Northwest in the long run, as did Southwest Airlines in other markets.
If not, Northwest could ultimately respond and drive Reno Air out, but as
soon as Northwest raised prices again, Reno Air could return. Each entry
107. If Northwest's costs are sufficiendy low, then presumably the $150 fares are short-run
profit-maximizing.
108. It is an open question whether the relevant market would be the market for travel to and
from Minneapolis or between particular city pairs. One reason to think that the relevant market is
not city pairs is that it might not be possible for a hypothetical monopoly of a single city pair to
raise price above the competitive level. Take, for example, the Reno-Minneapolis route. A
monopolist over that route alone could probably not raise price above competitive levels without
attracting swift entry and supply substitution from Northwest, which has a relatively easy time
flying between Minneapolis and any other city.
109. Borenstein estimates that Northwest's hub premium in Minneapolis was 21% in 1993
and 42% in 1994. Borenstein, supra note 101, at tbl.2, reprinted in OSTER & STRONG, supra note
101, at 33 tbl.6. But see Michael E. Levine, Price Discrimination Without Market Power, 18
YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?
abstract_id=224947 (arguing that high prices in some segments may reflect inelastic market
demand and the most efficient way to recover common costs, and should not be used to infer
monopoly power).
110. The fare drops of 25-40% can be inferred from comparing the first and second quarters
of 1993. OSTER & STRONG, supra note 101, at 9 fig.1.
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would likely be profitable because of the protection from the price freeze,
in contrast to the losses Reno Air suffered from its actual entry with no
legal protection. If Northwest is the more efficient carrier because of the
efficiencies of its hub, it would have to charge low prices consistently to
keep Reno Air out.
The rhetoric surrounding predatory pricing, and indeed much of
antitrust law, has developed in such a way that it seems as if there is a
"right" of firms to maximize profits in 'the short run, and that the law
cannot interfere with this "normal" business behavior. There is no obvious
reason, though, that Northwest should have the right to respond to Reno's
entry if the right to respond means that consumers must pay higher prices
than other firms could provide flights for.
B. Vanguard and American Airlines
The Department of Justice sued American Airlines for its reactions to
attempts by Vanguard, Western Pacific, Sun Airlines, and others either to
begin passenger service to Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport or to
expand services to that airport. Vanguard, for example, began operations in
late 1994, and began flying between Kansas City and Dallas-Fort Worth
with three daily nonstop round trips on January 30, 1995.111 At that time,
American operated eight round-trip flights, carrying 65% of the passengers
between Kansas City and Dallas-Fort Worth at an average one-way fare of
$107 to $117, and Delta had six flights."' The district court found that
"American matched Vanguard's regular low, unrestricted fares with fares
at the same fare level but with a penalty for refunds." 113 By April 1995,
one-way fares had reached $80 or lower, according to the Department of
Justice.' The fare war apparently drove Delta out early-company
officials announced a May 1 exit in February 1995."' According to the
district court, "American determined that it would have to choose between
a [market] 'share' strategy versus a 'revenue' strategy," and decided to add
six more flights to "stand up against Vanguard's service in the market." 116
At that point, Vanguard reduced its service to one round-trip daily. By
December 1995, Vanguard had no more nonstop flights between Dallas-
Fort Worth and Kansas City.
111. United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155 (D. Kan. 2001).
112. See Complaint 32, AMR Corp. (No. 99-1180), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2400/
2438.htm (explaining market share and pricing data).
113. AMRCorp., 140F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
114. The Complaint alleges that American's one-way fare was $80 in April 1995. Complaint
32, AMR Corp. (No. 99-1180), http://www.usdoj gov/atr/cases/f2400/2438.htm.
115. AMR Corp., 140F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
116. Id.
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Although American's revenues from flying this route were not below
its variable cost, American's price cuts made it unprofitable for Vanguard
to operate its three flights, and the combination of its price cuts and the
addition of extra flights made Vanguard withdraw its last remaining flight
by December. American's ability to drive Vanguard from this route without
itself suffering the losses that Bork's analysis predicted should come as no
surprise, given this Essay's analysis and the likely advantages of American,
including lower cost.'17 "After Vanguard ceased its nonstop DFW-MCI
service, American's service dropped to ten daily flights" and its average
fares increased from $75 to $100."8 Between January 1, 1996, and
September 1996, when the next period of predatory pricing allegedly began,
American's average fare continued to rise, ranging between $108 and
$147.119
In September 1996, Vanguard tried to build a mini-hub in Kansas City,
announcing that it would reintroduce nonstop service between Dallas-Fort
Worth and Kansas City, and introduce nonstop service between Dallas-Fort
Worth and Cincinnati and Phoenix. With a mini-hub and access to Dallas-
Fort Worth, Vanguard could take some advantage of the productive and
demand-side efficiencies of having a hub, and could potentially share with
American the hub premiums on fares from Dallas-Fort Worth to these
cities. Within days of Vanguard's announcement, however, American
announced an expansion of service to these cities, including new service to
Cincinnati, a route it had abandoned in 1994. Vanguard quickly
recalculated, and pulled out of the Dallas-Fort Worth-Cincinnati and
Dallas-Fort Worth-Phoenix routes in November 1996. Vanguard reduced its
service between Dallas-Fort Worth and Kansas City to a single daily
nonstop flight in one direction, and a connecting flight and a one-stop flight
in the opposite direction. American subsequently raised its fares
substantially on these spoke routes. Vanguard moved its mini-hub to
Kansas City and eliminated all service to or from Dallas-Fort Worth except
for flights from Kansas City.
The district court ruled that American's pricing reactions were perfectly
legal because they were not below cost and thus failed to meet the Brooke
Group requirements for a predatory pricing case. Moreover, the court
roundly rejected the Justice Department's attempt to get around the Brooke
Group rule by claiming that the case was about predatory capacity
improvements rather than pricing. Although American's increases in the
number of flights improved the quality of air travel by improving frequency
and reducing crowding in airplanes, the court felt that these extra flights
117. See the discussion of American's advantages supra note 12.
118. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-57.
119. Id. at 1171.
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represented increases in quantity that were the flip-side of decreases in
price, so that the case was nothing but a predatory pricing case.
Suppose the law took the view advocated in this Essay that price cuts
can be unlawfully exclusionary when undertaken by a dominant firm in
response to a substantial entry even when prices remain above cost. Since
market definition and the definition of monopoly are not the subject of this
Essay, let us assume that American Airlines either had or acquired
monopoly power, as is necessary for a monopolization case, or had a
reasonable prospect of acquiring monopoly power and the specific intent to
do so, as is necessary for an attempted monopolization case. (This
assumption is not entirely unreasonable given that both Delta and Vanguard
ceased all nonstop flights on this route by December 1995.) The remaining
element in either charge is therefore the exclusionary act of cutting prices or
increasing the number of flights.
Several things are worth noting about this case. The first is that pricing
below cost was apparently not necessary to induce exit, contrary to the
assertions of Bork and Easterbrook.
Under the rule proposed in this Essay, Vanguard could have priced
tickets from Kansas City to Dallas-Fort Worth at $88 each way in January
1995 to trigger the price freeze. This figure is slightly above the level to
which prices ultimately fell and seems a slight disadvantage to customers.
However, with the protection of the price freeze, Vanguard probably could
have filled its flights and expanded beyond three flights rather than being
driven from the market. 2 ' Therefore, the low fares could have lasted
through 1996 as well, suggesting a net benefit to consumers. (Vanguard
would have to keep fares low to maintain the protection from the price
freeze.) Passengers would have the option of continuing to fly with
American, paying higher fares but enjoying more choice in flight times.
Passengers would also gain frequent flyer miles that are presumably more
valuable due to American's extensive network. Unlike the model in Part IV,
these goods are imperfect substitutes, and Vanguard would not attract all
the passengers despite its lower fares. Vanguard would also suffer the
disadvantage that Dallas passengers are accustomed to calling American for
tickets and may do so by habit even after Vanguard has spent enough on
advertising so that passengers have heard of Vanguard. Moreover, many
passengers will be nervous about entrusting their safety to an upstart, with
or without good reason. Vanguard would have plenty of hurdles even if
American did not match its fares.
120. The assumption that Vanguard could have filled its flights so as to be profitable seems
reasonable because demand for air travel in this price range appears to be quite price responsive.
The court noted that on the Dallas to Wichita route an average price drop from $105 to $70 was
accompanied by a doubling of the number of people who flew the route. Id. at 1157.
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If Vanguard's flights became full, so that some consumers did not have
the low-fare choice, and if Vanguard were not moving quickly to
accommodate this excess demand, then American would be allowed to
respond, but even then it could not do what it actually did: lower prices and
increase capacity by so much that Vanguard's planes were too empty to be
profitable, forcing Vanguard to cancel its flights. American's license to
respond would be limited to passengers whom Vanguard is unable to serve.
As it happened, empty flights forced Vanguard to cut back to one flight per
day in April 1995 and no flights by December.
With the protection afforded by the proposed rule, Vanguard might
have accelerated its plan for a mini-hub in Dallas, rather than immediately
abandoning it, as it was forced to do in reality, because American could not
have responded immediately. If these routes and others were judged to be
separate markets, then American could try to preempt entry with limit
pricing. Such limit pricing would give customers benefits in many
additional markets, as American would not know where Vanguard might
enter; American would have to lower its prices wherever its fares appeared
to generate sufficient excess returns that even a firm with Vanguard's
disadvantages could think the market profitable.
If American had not been allowed to respond to Vanguard's substantial
entry and attempt to build a Dallas hub in late 1996, passengers flying
between Dallas-Fort Worth and Wichita, Phoenix, and Cincinnati would
have been able to fly at Vanguard's low fares for twelve to eighteen months
rather than at the higher fares that American ended up charging after
Vanguard exited those spoke routes. After the period of protection ended,
these customers presumably would have enjoyed the vigorous competition
of American. The worst case scenario would be that Vanguard would be
driven from the market at that point rather than immediately, as occurred.
Still, this might have meant fifteen to twenty-one months of low fares
instead of one or two months. More optimistically, Vanguard could have
developed a more loyal customer base, and perhaps expanded its emerging
Dallas hub to allow it to compete with American on a more permanent
basis. The other important advantage of the proposed rule is that American,
fearing all these possible benefits for customers, would be forced to price
lower to begin with in order to discourage Vanguard and others from
entering. That, too, would benefit consumers. Finally, at any given price
American charged, entry would be much more likely under this Essay's rule
than under the Brooke Group rule, so passengers could more frequently
enjoy the benefits of firms like Vanguard.
One thing the American Airlines case points out is that an incumbent
may try to increase quality instead of or in addition to lowering price in
reaction to entry. Quality is often more difficult to measure than price
(though not when it comes in the form of more convenient flight scheduling
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because of an increase in flights). Where quality is easily monitored, it
would be sensible to supplement a price freeze with a quality freeze for a
reasonable period of time.
C. Barry Wright
Barry Wright was an influential pre-Brooke Group case in which the
court held that predatory pricing suits could not be brought when prices
exceed all measures of cost. 2' Although the arguments in this Essay run
against Judge Breyer's opinion in Barry Wright, the proposal in this Essay,
even if extended, would be unlikely to have changed the result.
Barry was attempting to enter the market for manufacturing mechanical
snubbers for use in nuclear power plants, a market dominated by Pacific.'22
How would Barry have fared under the proposed rule? It seems far from
clear that it could have qualified as a substantial entrant. First, Barry never
actually got to the point in its development where it could produce
snubbers, so it could not avail itself of the automatic price freeze for pricing
20% below the Pacific monopoly. Pacific did respond by offering Grinnell
5% to 10% discounts. 23 It is unclear, however, whether Pacific initially
knew it was responding to Barry's development efforts or to Grinnell's lack
of demand. Pacific first offered Grinnell the discounts in August 1976,
although it only figured out that Grinnell was trying to help Barry enter
later in September 1976. Although Grinnell was tempted to accept Pacific's
August offer, Grinnell only bought temporary supplies and continued to
hope that Barry would provide a viable second source. After Barry
announced in January 1977 that it was nine to thirteen months behind on
beginning production (which was supposed to begin in January 1977),
Grinnell accepted Pacific's offer. Only later, in May 1997, when Barry
appeared even further behind, did Grinnell notify Barry that their dealings
were finished.
Since Grinnell purchased over fifty percent of U.S. snubbers, it had a
substantial interest in keeping Barry in the market if Barry's entry would
have kept prices down. Hence, if Grinnell ultimately gave up on Barry-in
part because of Pacific's lower offer but also in part because Barry was
behind schedule-we might view this as reasonable evidence that Barry's
entry attempts did not in the end rise to a substantial level. Grinnell's
interests were not perfectly aligned with snubber consumers generally, but
121. Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
122. Pacific was the only manufacturer of mechanical snubbers sold in the United States.
Because mechanical snubbers were so superior to hydraulic snubbers, Pacific's share of the
overall snubber market grew rapidly from 47% in 1976, to 83% in 1977, to 94% in 1979. Id. at
229.
123. The actual discounts were 25% to 30% compared to the usual discounts of 20%. Id.
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they were close enough to view Grinnell as a reasonable guardian of
consumer welfare and a reasonable judge of the substantiality of Barry's
entry in light of the mounting delays.
D. Cable Television in Sacramento
Hazlett reviews two recent aborted attempts to enter the cable television
market in Sacramento.'24 In the cable industry, subscriber contracts are sold
for prices far in excess of the capital expenditure required to get them,
suggesting that incumbents generally have substantial market power. Each
of the entrants chose a neighborhood in which it planned to compete with
the incumbent. The incumbent, which had ample warning of the entry,
began "remarketing" these areas and signing up new subscribers at steep
discounts, often with several months free. As an additional lure, the
incumbent offered customers a price-matching guarantee, promising not to
be undersold. Whether the incumbent's prices were below its variable cost
is unclear. By the time the entrants could begin marketing, however, there
were few customers left who were interested in cable even at very low
prices. As a result, even the better-financed entrant was forced to abandon
its investment (the worse-financed entrant was bought out).
How would this scenario be treated under the proposed rule? The
incumbent offered discounts as entrants began construction, even before the
entrants began marketing their services. Therefore, the question is whether
the entrants should be counted as "substantial" and thus trigger the price
freeze. Neither entrant met the straightforward twenty percent test, but on
the other hand, neither had a chance to do so. A reasonable criterion, then,
for judging the substantiality of the entry would be whether the construction
plans for laying cable would provide service to most houses in the
neighborhoods. If they did, then the entry should be judged substantial, at
least provisionally. The incumbent should be unable to respond at first, but
if the entrant fails to price at least twenty percent below the incumbent
when it ultimately begins marketing, then protection should cease, in the
same way that protection should cease if the entrant starts out undercutting
the incumbent by twenty percent and then quickly raises its price. Two
critical differences emerge between this incumbent's preemptive price cut
and the one in Barry Wright. In that case, Pacific may not have known of
Barry's entry when it first offered the price cut, and Barry Wright's later
delays made it seem an insubstantial entrant. Grinnell's decision to abandon
Barry supports this inference.
124. Thomas W. Hazlett, Predation in Local Cable TV Markets, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 609
(1995).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 111: 941
Above-Cost Predatory Pricing
E. Microsoft and Netscape
Consider the situation that gave rise to United States v. Microsoft
Corp."'25 Netscape created and marketed an Internet browser, giving the
browser away to some users and selling it to others. Microsoft was
concerned that the Netscape browser and Java, which came with it, both
had application program interfaces (APIs) that could ultimately challenge
Microsoft's Windows operating system. Microsoft therefore created a rival
browser, which it initially gave away for free or in many cases even paid
OEMs to install. Netscape began to give away its browser to all users,
effectively cutting its price in response to Microsoft. One therefore
wonders: Could Netscape be liable for predation under this Essay's rule?
That would surely be a perverse result.
Netscape probably did not have monopoly power in browsers, so this
Essay's rule would not apply. The government failed to show that browsers
were a relevant market. Even if Netscape had the only browser for a short
while, it is doubtful that the company had much power over price, and
Microsoft's entry would have been assured if Netscape priced too high (and
probably was assured regardless). Netscape might in fact have used this
Essay's rule to its own advantage by charging that Microsoft had a
monopoly in the market for APIs and that Microsoft responded to
Netscape's substantial entry in that market by introducing its own new
browser and its own Java APIs for free.
IX. CONCLUSION
This Essay has refocused the predatory pricing debate on ex ante
incentives-i.e., the incentives for entry and limit pricing before the
predatory period-instead of the traditional focus of high prices after the
predatory period. Ideally, a monopoly incumbent should price reasonably
low, and in the event that it prices high, other firms should enter the market.
The difficulty arises when the entrants have higher costs than the incumbent
and expect to be out-competed upon entry. Consumers would then be worse
off than if the monopoly firm did not exist, because they would have to pay
higher prices than entrants would charge if they entered.
Monopolies that cut prices dramatically in response to entry are
exclusionary because the behavior discourages entry. This observation
holds even if they are only matching rivals' prices, and even if they are
charging prices that exceed their costs. If courts view such behavior as
monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act, monopolies will price
lower than they do now under the Brooke Group rule.
125. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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Likewise, it is exclusionary for an incumbent monopoly to respond to
entry by substantially improving product quality, as when a monopoly
airline increases flight frequency. This behavior is no less exclusionary
when the product remains priced above cost, as in the AMR Corp. case. If
such behavior constitutes monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman
Act, monopolies will provide higher-quality products than they do now
under the Brooke Group rule.
The courts have two choices about how to recognize above-cost price
cuts and quality enhancements as exclusionary. The Supreme Court could
simply overrule Brooke Group. A more moderate approach in the lower
courts would distinguish the monopoly cases at issue in this Essay from
oligopoly cases like Brooke Group.2 6 As this Essay has pointed out, a
monopoly typically has substantial advantages that allow it to drive out
entrants without incurring losses, a possibility that is less plausible in
oligopoly cases like Brooke Group.
This Essay's predation rule essentially makes the market more
contestable.'27 A contestable market behaves like a competitive market even
when only one incumbent serves the market, because competitors wait in
the wings to enter if the incumbent prices high. The great advantage of a
contestable market is that low prices are ensured by the decisions of market
participants. No regulator needs to know the costs of other firms, and, in
fact, firms do not need to know other firms' costs. The market price is never
high, because if it were, competitors would enter and drive it down.
Certainly, recognizing a new category of above-cost predation would not
make markets perfectly contestable, but it would make markets more
contestable.
This Essay's arguments are strongest in the core case, with
homogeneous products, a cost advantage for the incumbent, and a clear
understanding of what constitutes substantial entry. Substantial
administrative difficulties arise when products are differentiated by quality
or other characteristics, when entrants are difficult to identify, or when it is
difficult to tell whether the incumbent is reacting after rather than before the
entrant has materialized. This Essay only briefly mentioned some of these
complexities but suggested as an example that if the overall deal offered by
an entrant seems comparable to a twenty percent discount on the
incumbent's product, the entrants would qualify as substantial and warrant
some protection. Such a standard, however, is easier to state than to
implement carefully. The variety of potential administrative difficulties is
126. A lower court risks being overturned on appeal because Brooke Group contains dicta
stating that the predation standard under section 2 of the Sherman Act is the same as that under
the Robinson-Patman Act. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 222 (1993).
127. See BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 82.
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daunting indeed, but the same is true in other antitrust cases. How is the
court to know, for example, whether a merger will or will not be
anticompetitive?
The Essay has not dealt further with administrative complexities,
because to do so in advance would yield limited insights. Such questions
are best faced as they come before the courts. Hopefully, this Essay has at
least made clear that low prices can harm consumers and also lower total
welfare even if prices exceed cost-a possibility that one sees most clearly
by focusing on ex ante incentives to enter the market.
The principal substantive objection to the rule proposed here is that it
protects inefficient entrants. Why would we want inefficient firms in the
market, and what business is it of antitrust to protect them? The best answer
is that consumers often need inefficient entrants. Recall that the entrant only
receives any protection if it is a "substantial entrant," which I suggest
operationalizing as one pricing at least twenty percent below the incumbent.
Only entrants who provide substantial benefits to consumers receive any
protection. From the vantage point of overall wealth maximization, the
advantages of this rule are ambiguous if the incumbent does not charge low
enough limit prices to bar all entry, because some less efficient firms may
enter.'28 Consumer benefits are more certain, however, since limit pricing is
encouraged; and at any given incumbent price level, entry is encouraged.
Conditional upon entry, the entrant has a strong incentive to price twenty
percent below the incumbent instead of ducking just under the monopoly
price umbrella. Courts that favor total welfare maximization over
maximizing consumer benefits could modify the proposed rule
appropriately. 12 9
128. The lower prices improve overall welfare, but the higher cost of production lowers
welfare. The net result can be ambiguous in general. When limit pricing is perfect and prevents all
higher-cost rivals from entering, as in the model here, then overall welfare is improved by this
Essay's rule.
129. Such courts might modify the standard of substantiality of entry that a plaintiff must
demonstrate; instead of the entrant showing merely that its discount was substantial enough to
bring consumers large benefits, the cntrant might also be required to show that its costs were
sufficiently low that its entry increased total welfare.
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